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This paper discusses a broad methodology and detailed steps to analyse macroeconomic policy options 
to recover from the Covid-19 crisis at country level. It presents a range of variables and impact pathways 
that can be used to describe the macroeconomic context in the case study countries of Bangladesh, 
Kenya, Peru, Sri Lanka and Tanzania; the types of steps that could be undertaken in these five countries, 
covering fiscal, monetary and trade policies; and what outcome variables to look for. It also considers 
policy options, and finally the pros and cons of possible methods to assess the impact of the policy 
scenarios on the impact variables, among them economic, social and environmental variables.  
The paper has a number of core tasks for researchers at country level: 
• describe the Covid-19 baseline current impact, current macroeconomic policies and expected 
growth trajectories (gross domestic product, balance of payments, government balances) and 
discuss the complex background of the countries in terms of poverty, informality, climate change 
and gender equality  
• develop macroeconomic policy options for assessment: fiscal, financial and/or trade policy 
• use appropriate methods such as causal chain analysis and modelling to analyse the impact of 
policy measures on economic, social/gender and environmental variables.  
This paper provides background to these steps including initial data and additional information. Table 4 in 
the text for example provides basic data for baseline trajectories, whilst table 10 provides a snapshot of 
the policies currently being considered for analysis by the country analysists. Table ES1 below (Table 11 
in text) provides a range of considerations for the assessment of policy impacts.  
Table ES1. Assessing impact of macroeconomic policies  






• The level and sectoral and 
distributional focus of 
spending 
• Multiplier and indirect effects 
(including on trade, and 
climate change), which 
depend on e.g. level of initial 
public capital and debt, trade 
openness, elasticity of 
consumption, exchange rate 
regime 
• Debt sustainability and links 
with financial stability 
• Female employment 
intensity of targeted sectors  
• Direct or indirect support to 
female dominated sectors? 
What type of employment 
(fixed wage? Safe working 
conditions, skill level) 
prevail in the female-
dominated sectors targeted 
by the stimulus?  
• What economic sectors are 
targeted by the stimulus: are 
they low or high greenhouse 
gas emissions for input and 
production process? Are they 
energy-intensive and what 
energy do they rely on?  
• Are the sectors targeted 
supporting adaptation to 
climate change (e.g. climate 
smart agricultural 
technology)? 
• Can there be a double dividend where the sector supported 







• Interest rate sensitivity of 
investment and consumption 
• Reach of targeted finance 
• Non-performing loans, debt 
levels and financial stability 
• Conditions of access to 
women at household and 
enterprise level? 
• Conditionality of access to 
credit for carbon-intensive 




Tariff and non-tariff 





• Impact on trade volumes and 
trade prices  
• Consumer prices, 
productivity  
• Sectoral value addition 
 
• What is the female intensity 
of economic sectors and 
sub-sectors affected by 
trade policy change? 
• Types of goods affected by 
relative price changes: who 
consumes them? 
• Does liberalisation affect low-
carbon goods and services? 
 
These analytical steps at country level will be complemented by cross-country modelling analyses (e.g. 








Ensuring a healthy macro-economy is crucial for a high-quality recovery from Covid-19. Engineering 
appropriate stimulus packages, keeping a stable financial sector and reviving high value-added exports 
are core tasks of governments across the world as they also try to recover from the economic effects of 
the pandemic in 2020–2023. Unfortunately, the context in low-income settings looks more depressed 
because of lack of finance and more vulnerable economies.  
Informing policy options for a better macro-economy in lower-income settings is a core task of an 
International Development Research Centre (IDRC)-funded project undertaken by the Overseas 
Development Institute (ODI) and five other think-tanks. This paper presents a methodology and a range 
of methods to provide quality research and analysis that can underpin such policy advice. 
The project aims to inform policy-makers in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kenya, Peru and Tanzania on 
appropriate policies to address the Covid-19 recession and recovery over 2021–2023, with a focus on the 
interface between macroeconomic policies and economic, social (especially gender) and environmental 
outcomes. It has a focus on fiscal, financial and trade policies, including: 
• What is an appropriate size and direction of fiscal stimulus, balancing increased spending to 
protecting people and firms now with increased debt and taxation later? What is the scope for 
increased fiscal spending towards achieving improved social and environmental outcomes? 
• What other macroeconomic policies such as financial sector policies are needed to balance 
procyclical action, protecting the economy from a downturn now and promoting financial stability 
throughout?  
• What is the role of trade policy in ensuring trade will lead a recovery to a better future that supports 
job, especially for women, reduces inequalities, and helps transition to a low-carbon economy? 
A methodology to examine these questions needs to consider the following issues:  
• Context: Assessing the current macroeconomic impact of and policy responses to Covid-19 and 
the current poverty and environmental context, and envisaging broad scenarios/trajectories for the 
coming three to five years (Section 3); 
• Policy design: Designing a set of policy anchors to guide policy responses and suggesting policy 
simulations of specific macroeconomic policy packages, including fiscal, financial and trade policies 
(Section 4); 
• Impact assessment: Assessing possible impacts of policies (economic, social and environmental) 
(Section 5).  
This paper discusses these issues in turn. Section 2 presents the methodology in broad terms and 


















2 PRESENTING THE BROAD METHODOLOGY 
 
Informing future policy responses to Covid-19 requires a good understanding of the macroeconomic 
impact of Covid-19 and of the impact of policy responses so far. In order to analyse possible impacts of 
policy options over the coming three to five years, it is important to have a baseline against which to 
compare policy suggestions. The baseline in this case is the combination of impacts of Covid-19, policy 
responses so far and a set of basic projections in the case of no additional policies. 
Once we know the baseline trajectories for each country, we can examine the impact of new policies. We 
divide policies into two main categories or anchors (which will be explained later): those policies facilitating 
a fast short-term economic recovery and those aimed at building back better, by taking into account long 
term economic, social and environmental objectives. Following Te Velde (2009), we also call the building 
back better anchor a “rainbow recovery”, as policies would be aimed at firms (blue), people and 
households (red) and environmental purposes (green). 
The methodology focuses on fiscal, financial and trade policies, though it is not the case that each country 
will provide two sets of policies in each of these areas. The methodology aims to assess the broad 
economic, social and environmental impacts of the policies.  
Figure 1 provides a summary of the five core building blocks in the methodology we use in this paper. The 
considerations in this paper have been informed by joint work with Southern Voice and southern think 
tanks (see Box 1).  
 
Figure 1. Building blocks in the methodology for the analysis of impact of and macroeconomic 
















Box 1. Uneven Covid-19 impacts in the Global South – Southern perspectives 
 
The impacts of Covid-19 in the Global South have been different from those in the Global North. As of now, in 
some places in the Global South the health impacts have been less severe. However, these impacts are evolving 
and a final analysis in a couple of years may reveal a different picture. With vaccination campaigns currently 
prioritising countries in the Global North, the pandemic may last longer and have deeper impacts in the Global 
South as countries wait for access to the vaccine. 
 
The Global South has been affected in terms of prospects of economic growth and social well-being. Pre-existing 
issues, such as high levels of economic informality, lack of fiscal space and increasing and persistent gender 
gaps, have made the policy response less effective. Covid-19 has severely affected economies. Gross domestic 
product (GDP) has been affected not only because of lockdowns but also because of the global slowdown and 
its effects on tourism, goods trade and capital flows. While the immediate health and direct economic impact 
appears to be lower for poorer economies, or similar to in richer countries, poorer countries are likely to be 
affected more in the medium term because of less well-resourced policy responses. However, the impact of the 
crisis also varies markedly among poorer countries. 
 
The pandemic is having significant social impacts, such as rising inequalities and the creation of new vulnerable 
groups. In the short term, it is causing loss of wages and other sources of income. In the medium term, it is 
expected that a deep economic recession will exacerbate unemployment, poverty and inequality. The majority 
of the population in the Global South earns a living in the informal economy. Many policy measures are not 
helping workers who cannot benefit from any social protection system the country has in place.  
Women worldwide, and particularly in developing countries, are affected more by the crisis than men. Women 
are overrepresented in the sectors most affected by lockdowns and economic recession, particularly in service 
provision, such as restaurants, tourism and entertainment. Domestic violence against women is expected to rise 
as a result of the Covid-19-related crisis. Meanwhile, the digital and technological divide within the Global South 
will have a large impact on children’s learning opportunities in a distance education context. 
 
Governments in the Global South have been able to provide only a limited response to Covid-19. Most countries 
have little room to increase fiscal spending, much needed during this crisis, owing to high debt, rising interest 
payments and limited tax revenues. One of the challenges for governments is to find ways to overcome the 
digital and technological divide within countries. Furthermore, programmes should consider technical assistance 
and cash components to provide support to the self-employed, including through soft skills and digital skills. It is 
key for policy responses to incorporate a gender perspective, given that the crisis is affecting women more 
severely than men. Since tax revenues remain low, further progressive reform is needed, to go hand-in-hand 
with the formalisation of the economy to expand the tax base. 
 
The international development community was not prepared for this pandemic. The development cooperation 
architecture was more disadvantaged because of the current fractured state of the multilateral system. Absence 
of leadership to mount a rapid and vigorous global response has been felt acutely. In line with strengthening the 
multilateral system, a global response should not entail just the sum of existing and new facilities by the providers 
of development finance. This is a unique opportunity to  secure coordination and coherence of these 
interventions and maximise their impact. 
 







3 THE COVID-19 BASELINE: MACROECONOMIC IMPACT 
AND PROJECTIONS AND POLICY RESPONSES SO FAR  
 
Covid-19 has had a major macroeconomic impact on economies globally.  Section 3.1 discusses 
macroeconomic impacts globally. Countries across the world have also used macroeconomic policies to 
respond to the impacts of the pandemic (Section 3.2). International organisations have a range of 
projections of the macro-economy for the coming years (Section 3.3). Different countries are affected 
differently and have responded in differing ways. This reflects in part the overall background, including 
debt vulnerabilities, poverty levels and environmental degradation and pollution (Section 3.4). These 
background sections provide a range of suggestions that country-level assessments can use to describe 
what we call the Covid-19 baseline (Section 3.5) against which policy options can be assessed. 
3.1 Macroeconomic impact 
 
Covid-19 has so far had a major impact globally in terms of people’s health and lives, repressed mobility, 
disrupted economic production, tempered consumption and investment and generated massive 
unemployment. In 2020, poor countries faced adverse economic spillover from the resulting global 
economic downturn, while having had to address the impact of domestic shocks from stringent measures 
implemented to contain the spread of the virus. Although there is some optimism for the 2021 outlook 
following recent multiple vaccine approvals, there may still be material downside risks for poor countries 
as a result of uncertainties around equitable and timely access to vaccines, potential renewed waves from 
the new Covid-19 variant mutation, debt sustainability and financial stability. 
Recent forecasts by major organisations point to global output recovery in 2021 after severe economic 
fall-out from the pandemic last year. For instance, the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2021a) has 
estimated that, after a sharp contraction of 3.5% in 2020, global output will grow at 5.5% in 2021. This 
projection is largely driven by the anticipated growth in advanced economies with wider vaccine availability 
and additional fiscal support measures, which is expected to spill over to developing countries through 
trade linkages. 
The unprecedented declines in global GDP in 2020 led to major declines in global trade. Global trade fell 
sharply by 19% in Q2 2020 and continued to contract by 4.5% as of Q3 2020 (UNCTAD, 2020a). The 
World Trade Organization’s (WTO) (2019) previous assumption of 3% global trade growth in 2020 was 
revised to 13–32% declines during the peak of the pandemic in April 2020 (WTO, 2020a). More recently, 
the WTO (2020b, 2020c) updated its estimate to a 9.2% contraction in global trade in 2020, following 
rebound in trade volumes (especially in electronics, textiles and automotive products) in Q3 2020 (WTO 
2020b, 2020c). By 2021, trade is expected to grow by 7.2% (WTO, 2020b).  
Meanwhile, prospects for services trade recovery remain weak: this is expected to fall by 24% in 2020 
(WTO, 2021). By sector, the sharpest decline in Q3 2020 was recorded for travel services  
(-68%), followed by transport services (-24%) (ibid.). Specifically, international tourism arrivals recorded a 
70% decline from January to August 2020 and are projected not to return to 2019 levels until 2023 
(UNWTO, 2020). This translates to $730 billion loss in tourism revenues (which is eight times the loss 


























Notes: 1/ As indicated in latest forecasts in IMF (2021a), OECD (2020) and World Bank (2021). 2/ As indicated in pre-Covid-
19 forecasts in IMF (2019),OECD (2019) and World Bank (2020c)  
 
Table 2 provides a summary of the pre-Covid19 and latest global trade growth rate projections. 
Table 2. Pre-Covid-19 and latest global trade growth projections  
   Pre-Covid-19 Latest (amid Covid-19) 
2020  2020  2021 
WTO  3% -9.2% 7.2% 
IMF  3% -9.6% 8.1% 
UNDESA  2.3% -7.6% 6.9% 
World Bank  3.2% -9.5% 5.0% 
Sources: WTO (2019a, 2020b); IMF (2019, 2021a) ; UNDESA (2019, 2021); World Bank (2020c, 2021) 
For 2020, goods trade is expected to decline by 9.2%, before rising by 7.2% in 2021 (WTO, 2020). 
International tourism arrivals declined by 70% from January to August 2020 and are projected not to return 
to 2019 levels until 2023 (UNWTO, 2020). This translates to $730 billion loss in tourism revenues (which 
is eight times the loss compared with the global financial crisis in 2009) (ibid.).  
Global foreign direct investment (FDI) fell by 42% in 2020, and is expected to remain weak in 2021 
(UNCTAD, 2021). Developing country FDI (which is 72% of global FDI) fell by 12% in 2020, as FDI to 
China and India was up. FDI to Africa decreased by 18% in 2020 (from $46 billion in 2019 to $38 billion in 
2020). Remittance flows to low- and middle-income countries are projected also to fall, by 7%, in 2020, 
and to further decline by 7.5% in 2021 (World Bank, 2020a). 
Financial markets also experienced heightened risk aversion at the onset of the pandemic, with substantial 









forecasts (%) 2/ 
Latest forecast (with 
Covid-19) real GDP 
growth (%) 1/ 
Difference from pre-




2020 2021 2020 2021 2020 2021  
IMF  
World 2.8 3.3 3.4 -3.5 5.5 6.8 -2.1  
Advanced 
economies 




3.6 4.4 4.6 -2.4 6.3 6.8 -1.7  
Low-income 
developing countries  
5.3 5.1 5.1 -0.8 5.1 5.9 0.0  
OECD  
World 2.7 2.9 3.0 -4.2 4.2 7.1 -1.2  
G20 2.9 3.2 3.3 -3.8 4.7 7.0 -1.4  
OECD 1.7 1.6 1.7 -5.5 3.3 7.1 -1.6  
Non-OECD 3.7 4.0 4.0 -3.0 5.1 7.0 -1.1  
World Bank 




1.4   1.5 -5.4  3.3 





4.1   4.3 -2.6  5.0 
6.7 -0.7  
Low-income 
developing countries  
4.0 
5.4   5.5 -0.9  3.3 








Sub-Saharan Africa 2.4 2.9 3.1 -3.7 2.7 6.6 0.4  
Kenya 5.4 6 5.8 -1 6.9 7.0 -1.1  
Tanzania 5.8 5.8 6.1 2.5 5.5 3.3 0.6  
South Asia 4.4 5.5 5.9 -6.7 3.3 12.2 2.6  
Bangladesh 8.2 7.2 7.3 2 1.6 5.2 5.7  
Sri Lanka 2.3 3.3 3.7 -6.7 3.3 10.0 0.4  
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
1.0 1.8 2.4 -6.9 3.7 8.7 -1.3  






pressure and tightened financial conditions in many emerging and developing countries (OECD, 2020b; 
World Bank, 2020b). However, the swift and bold actions of monetary authorities to alleviate market stress 
contributed to the subsequent easing of financial conditions (IMF, 2020c). In addition, November 2020 
data shows strong inflows for emerging market equities and debt, which reached $76.5 billion following 
news on vaccines and certainty of the results of the US elections (IIF, 2020). Expectations for a global 
recovery underpinned by roll-out of the vaccines have lifted asset prices, and the ongoing rebound of 
portfolio flows can provide a source of funding for emerging economies in 2021 (IMF, 2021b). 
While the current account surpluses and deficit are expected to narrow modestly by about 0.3% of world 
GDP in 2020, economies dependent on oil, tourism and remittances are severely affected, with negative 
effects on external current account that will imply balance of payment pressures (IMF, 2020b). This will 
necessitate large economic adjustment (e.g. allowing exchange rate to absorb the shock, with inflationary 
implications) or external borrowing (e.g. with fiscal sustainability implications). The worsening risk 
sentiment further increases the risks of an external crisis, especially for economies with a large current 
account deficit and foreign debt and low foreign reserves (ibid.).  
With respect to the fiscal balance, the large increases in fiscal expenditures to provide immediate support 
to affected individuals, firms and sectors, as well as the foregone tax revenues from tax relief measures 
and general output contraction amid the pandemic, will put pressure on government accounts. The IMF 
(2021c) projects that government deficits will reach -11.8% of GDP in 2020 before slightly narrowing to -
8.5% of GDP in 2021; government debt will hit 97.6% and 99.5% of GDP in 2020 and 2021, respectively. 
Governments may also face unprecedented risks from the provision of loan guarantees should the impact 
of Covid-19 remain protracted and force firms to default. These will take a toll especially on low-income 
countries, more than half (38 out of 70 countries) of which are already at high risk of debt distress or in 
debt distress (IMF, 2021c).  
Throughout the pandemic, the International Labour Organization (ILO, 2021) estimates that labour market 
disruptions led to 225 million full-time equivalent job losses in 2020, with higher employment losses for 
women and young workers. Africa’s losses amounted to 29 million full-time equivalents in 2020. 
This deep downturn in the global economy is affecting low- and middle-income countries through their 
exposure to global trade (e.g. oil and commodity exports), tourism, financial and investment flows (Raga 
and te Velde, 2020). For instance, as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic, Africa’s private sector is facing a 
large recession, the likes of which have not been seen for 25 years. This is putting more than 20 million 
jobs and many livelihoods at risk and is pushing millions of people into poverty.  
International trade data as of Q2 2020 indicates sharp export declines, by 41% in West and South Asia; 
by 35%, in Africa; and by 21% in Latin America – although data as of July indicates easing export 
contraction (UNCTAD, 2020a). FDI flows to Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean and Asia fell by 18%, 
37% and 4%, respectively, in 2020 (UNCTAD, 2021). Greenfield project announcements also dropped 
drastically in Africa (-63%), Latin America and the Caribbean (-51%) and Asia (-38%) in 2020 (ibid.). 
Remittances are likely to fall in Latin America and the Caribbean, South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa by 
0.2%, 4% and 9%, respectively, in 2020 (World Bank, 2020a).  
The disruption in intra-regional trade in East Africa is reflected in the decline by 83% of Kenya’s re-exports, 
driven by the sharp fall of Kenyan exports to Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda (Mold and Mveyange, 2020). 
Between January and October 2020, tourist arrivals fell significantly in Africa  
(-69%), the Americas (-68%) and Asia and the Pacific (-82%) (UNWTO, 2020). In the financial sector, 
capital outflows from emerging and frontier markets surged at the onset of the crisis, as exhibited by the 
$5 billion outflow from Sub-Saharan Africa between February and March. However, flow to the region 
started to slightly recover ($1.3 billion) from June to September, consequently narrowing spreads (IMF, 
2020d).  
Despite the generally contracting economies, some sectors are recovering fast and are thriving amid the 
pandemic. Double digit growth was recorded in Q3 2020 global trade in clothing (24%), computers (11%) 
and computer parts (10%) (WTO, 2020c). Bangladesh’s exports (mainly garments) are exhibiting a V-
shape trend, falling initially by 2% in March and steeply by 83% in April and with an easing decline by 2.5% 






surpassed levels of past years (Mold and Mveyange, 2020), and demand for flowers had recovered to 
85% of pre-pandemic demand as of July (Mohammed, 2020). Remittances in Zimbabwe increased by 
33% to $466 million from last year (Vinga, 2020), highlighting the countercyclical role of remittances as 
migrants help families by sending money at home during the pandemic. 
 
3.2 Broad macroeconomic policy responses so far  
 
To contain the Covid-19 pandemic, governments worldwide have imposed stringent measures (e.g. 
national lockdowns, border closures, travel restrictions, social distancing), coupled with large fiscal and 
monetary stimulus packages to prevent massive economic fall-out. Many low- and middle-income 
countries have also implemented strict social distancing measures at similar or stricter levels than G20 
members, despite not having ample government resources to provide expansionary fiscal stance to 
support halted businesses operations and people’s lives and livelihoods during lockdown periods. For 
instance, by the autumn of 2020, government fiscal stimulus and liquidity injection packages amounted to 
27% expressed in terms of 2018 GDP in G20 economies, compared with an average of 3.4% fiscal and 
central bank support in Sub-Saharan African countries (Figure 2). In per capita terms, this equates to more 
than $27,000 government support per person in Japan compared with $56 per person in Kenya, and less 
than a dollar support per person in South Sudan (ODI, 2020). More recent IMF (2021c) estimates suggest 
that global fiscal support to address the health and economic impact of Covid-19 has reach $14 trillion. 
With relatively more policy space than government budget, central banks have also utilised monetary and 
financial policy tools, such as lowering interest rates and cash reserve requirements, setting special loan 
facilities directly for affected sectors and encouraging and relaxing limits on digital money.  
While a range of short- to medium-term policy options have been widely discussed and laid out to help 
developing countries navigate through the pandemic crisis, in the first few months of the pandemic most 
governments’ immediate responses focused on supporting the domestic health system and extending aid 
to the most vulnerable individuals and groups. For example, 80% of the first economic stimulus package 
announced in Kenya in March 2020 were in tax relief, reductions and refunds (foregone tax revenue) and 
social protection (Figure 3 – characterised as ‘red stimulus’ – see te Velde, 2009), wherein government 
injects finance into the economy to stimulate consumption and demand and aim for short-term 
macroeconomic stabilisation.  
International and bilateral donors and financial institutions (e.g. the IMF, the World Bank, the G20, the 
African Development Bank (AfDB)) have stepped up to provide aid, debt relief and special financing 
facilities to support government efforts in poor developing countries to finance Covid-19-related responses. 
However, the responses are not commensurate with the size of the crisis. According to an ODI blog 
(Humphrey and Prizzon, 2018), multilateral development banks (MDBs) have expanded lending by about 
30% relative to 2019, compared with 70% after the global financial crisis, and lending is expected to revert 
to previous levels next year. Lending by the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
(IBRD) for middle-income borrowers rose to $27.9 billion in FY2020, up 20% over the previous year and 
evidence of a fast but limited response. It should also be said that Chinese lending to the poorest countries 
has fallen rapidly in 2019 reducing the level of external finance for e.g. Africa. The policy responses are 









Figure 2. Economic stimulus (as % of 2018 GDP) 
 
Notes: Economic stimulus packages announced in 2020 in response to Covid-19. Fiscal stimulus includes aid, grants and guarantees. Monetary stimulus includes only central banks’ 
explicit monetary liquidity injection (e.g. through lending facilities, open market operations, purchase of government securities) and expected impact from lowering policy interest 
rates and other initiatives; does not reflect measures by regional central banks. See table below for details. Proposal for Sub-Saharan Africa is based on ODI recommendation. G20 
members excluding EU. Weighted average for G20 and Sub-Saharan African aggregates.  
Sources: News reports, government and central bank press releases, IMF policy tracker, ODI country briefers. GDP data from WDI database and UN (for South Sudan only); exchange 






































A recent survey conducted by the World Bank suggests that only a fraction of businesses interviewed 
reported that they had access to public support, with the findings much worse in low-income settings. For 
example, only 4.6% of firms had access to public support measures in countries with a GDP per capita of 
less than $2,500, but this increased to 37.9% in countries with a GDP per capita higher than $10,000. The 
reasons are multiple, including that many firms in the private sector are in the informal sector and hence 
are difficult to reach. Additionally, there is a lack of finance for such support measures because low-income 
countries do not have access to large sources of finance; where they do, they may not channel such 
finance to the companies that need it. More attention is urgently needed in supporting national 
development banks that can reach the local private sector (te Velde, 2020). 
Countries have also used policy levers of monetary policy, including the bank/discount rate, open market 
operations, the variable reserve ratio and changes in liquidity. As with the great financial crisis of 2008–
2009, central banks have launched a range of new broad-based programmes, including to purchase riskier 
assets such as corporate bonds, in order to stem the cost of credit; central banks are ensuring that 
households and firms continue to have access to credit at an affordable price. To date, central banks have 
announced plans to expand their provision of liquidity – including through loans and asset purchases –by 
at least $6 trillion and have indicated they will do more if needed. Table 3 provides examples of monetary 
responses in the five countries of interest to this project. Further details can be found in Appendix 1. 
Trade policy since the start of Covid-19 has focused on securing the supply of critical products associated 
with the health response to the crisis. The revision of measures adopted by WTO members1 suggests very 
limited adoption of trade policies aimed at supporting the economic recovery. Members introduced a series 
of export restrictions on the exports of protective personal equipment (PPE) and medical supplies. The 
response also included some liberalisation measures (tariff reduction) aimed at reducing the cost and 
increasing the supply of the same products.  
A response to the health crisis, with significant long-term implications, is the ban on imports of non-
essential products adopted by Sri Lanka. While the measure aims to reserve the foreign exchange to 
support the imports of essential goods (including all vehicles), the measure has extended for almost a year 
and it is expected to continue in 2021.2  
Table 3. Developments in monetary policies, and financial indicators: illustrative country-level 
examples since start of Covid-19 
 Monetary policies   Financial indicators Trade policy 
Bangladesh  Reductions in repo rate and cash 
reserve ratios. Increase in export 
development fund to $5 billion, with 
fixed interest rate increased 
refinancing limit. Creation of several 
refinancing schemes including a 
360-day repo facility and a credit 
guarantee scheme to support 
exporters, farmers and small and 
medium enterprises. Foreign 
exchange rules eased to allow 
foreign companies to access short-
term loans. Bangladesh Bank 
continues to intervene in foreign 
exchange market to stem weakness 
in the taka against the US dollar.  
Non-performing loans (NPLs) in 
Bangladesh are at a high level in 
private banks, development finance 
institutes and predominantly state-
owned banks (ADB, 2019).  
 
At 12.7%, monetary growth has 
remained close to the target ceiling 
of 13%.  
 
Bangladesh’s currency stance poses 
















products and PPE 
 
 







 Monetary policies   Financial indicators Trade policy 
Kenya The Central Bank of Kenya has 
lowered its policy rate by 100 bps to 
7.255, lowered banks’ cash reserve 
ratio by 100 bps to 4.25% and 
raised the maximum length of 
repurchase agreements from 28 to 
91 days, crucially. Plans are to 
operationalise the Credit Guarantee 
Scheme for vulnerable micro, small 
and medium sized enterprises.  
At 13%, NPLs are high and rising in 
the manufacturing and trade sectors, 
owing to deteriorating profits. Total 
loans amounting to 29% of total 
bank loans were restructured by 
June. Inflation remains well 
anchored. The exchange rate 
depreciation has been more 
problematic. It reflects an outflow of 
investment, owing in part to risk 
aversion. 
General reduction 




exports of face 
masks  
 
Temporary ban on 
imports of used 
textile products and 
used footwear 
Peru The Central Reserve Bank of Peru 
cut its policy rate by 200 basis 
points to 0.25%. It has reduced the 
reserve requirement, provided 
liquidity to the financial system 
through repo operations. Financial 
institutions have been allowed to 
change loan terms without changing 
classification of the loans. The Bank 
approved a package (of over 8.8% 
of GDP) in liquidity assistance 
(backed by government guarantees) 
to support lending. The Reactiva 
Perú Programme has provided 
loans to affected businesses: by 
August, 295,708 businesses had 
received loans within the framework, 
mostly small and medium 
enterprises. 
Money growth has shown resilience 
and inflation is contained at just 
below 2%. Peru also does not have 









reduction of import 
tariffs on 
pharmaceutical 
products and PPE 
Sri Lanka The Central Bank of Sri Lanka has 
cut policy rates by 200 bps since 
March, cutting the required reserves 
ratio of commercial banks by 3 
percentage points and cutting the 
interest rate on Bank advances by 
650 bps. It is supporting its reserves 
through foreign currency purchases 
and foreign currency swaps with the 
Reserve Bank of India and licensed 
banks (CBSL, 2020). Capital 
controls on investment outflows and 
remittances have been instituted, 
alongside import restrictions of 
certain goods, including agricultural 
produce and vehicles.  Financial 
institutions are rescheduling NPLs, 
while loan classification rules have 
been relaxed. 
Annual private sector credit growth 
decelerated in June 2020. Credit to 
the public sector has accelerated, 
causing an expansion of broad 
money in 2020. Interest rates on 
new lending by commercial banks, 
on average, have now reduced to 
single-digit levels. As of late July, 
there have been net capital outflows 
of around $500 million (0.6% of 
GDP) since mid-February, mostly 
from the domestic treasury market. 
The Sri Lankan currency 
depreciated by around 2.7% against 
the US dollar in the half year since. 
Sri Lanka’s EMBIG spread has more 







Reduction of tariffs 
and increase of 















 Monetary policies   Financial indicators Trade policy 
Tanzania The Bank of Tanzania  reduced the 
discount rate from 7% to 5% and 
reduced collateral haircuts 
requirements on government 
securities. The Statutory Minimum 
Reserves requirement was reduced 
from 7% to 6%.   
NPLs are being targeted by the 
Bank of Tanzania. At 10%, the share 
of NPLs is high and likely to rise if 
international lines of credit are not 
renewed and further defaults 
emerge. It has provided regulatory 
flexibility to banks to restructure its 
loans and other financial institutions 
that will carry out loan restructuring 
operations on a case-by-case basis. 
Tariff reduction for 
medical supply 
products 
Source: Appendix 1 
3.3 Macroeconomic projections 
 
Several international institutions provide macroeconomic forecasts that can be used as economic 
background. For example, the IMF estimated a recession in 2020 but projected a quick upturn for 2021 
(looking similar to a V-shaped recovery) and sustained growth through 2022, underpinned by optimism on 
the vaccine roll-out coupled with economic activities that are adapting to socially distanced environments 
(IMF, 2021a) . The forecast of the World Bank shows similar trends but is more pessimistic than the 
forecast of the IMF for 2020 to 2022. The WTO was very pessimistic about trade in 2020 but revised 
estimates upwards throughout the year. Table 4 provides a summary, including the latest World Bank 
(2021) macroeconomic projections for the five case studies. 
While macroeconomic forecasts suggest that developed and G20 countries will be affected more than 
poorer countries, this is not true when considering the longer term. The World Bank (2021) suggests world 
growth will drop by 4.3% in 2020. GDP growth in emerging and developing economies and low-income 
countries will be lower by more than 6% in 2020 owing to Covid-19. However, the long-term GDP per 
capita effects are evident in poorer countries: 31% of emerging and developing economies and 16% of 
low-income countries are expected to lose at least 10 years of per capita income gains (ibid.). This is in 
part because the magnitude of policy responses is less. For example, Raga and Housseini (2020) suggest 
fiscal and to some extent monetary responses have been lower – fiscal stimulus packages as a share of 
GDP are 10 times less in low-income countries/Africa than in G20 countries. A substantial financing gap 
remains in Sub-Saharan Africa, estimated at between $130 billion and 410 billion over 2020–2023 (IMF, 
2020d) 
 
Table 4. GDP growth and trade growth projections, 2020–2022 
  
Covered 
GDP growth (%) Trade volume growth1 (%) 
2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 
IMF  World -3.5 5.5 4.2 -9.6 8.1 6.3 
OECD  World -4.2 4.2 4.2 -10.3 3.9 4.4 
World Bank  World -4.3 4.0 3.8  -9.5 5.0 5.1 
WTO  World -4.8 4.9   -9.2 7.2   
AfDB  Africa  -1.7 to -3.4 3.0 to 2.4         
ADB  Developing Asia -0.4 6.8         
Country 
projections2 
Bangladesh 2.0 1.6 3.4 -12.5 0.5 15.1 
Kenya -1.0 6.9 5.7 -13.4 13.4 8.7 
Peru -12.0 7.6 4.5 -13.4 7.5 4.3 
Sri Lanka -6.7 3.3 2.0 -19.9 33.1 15.2 
Tanzania 2.5 5.5 6.0 -2.3 3.7 3.7 
1/Trade measures as follows: IMF: trade in goods and services; OECD: real trade; World Bank: goods and nonfactor 
services; WTO: merchandise trade. 2/ Country GDP projections are based on World Bank (2021); country trade growth 
projections are based on IMF (2020e). 
Sources of aggregate GDP and trade growth projections: IMF ( 2021a), OECD (2020), World Bank (2021), WTO 







3.4 The underlying socioeconomic and environmental context 
 
3.4.1 Debt distress  
 
The devastating macroeconomic impacts are happening at a time when many low-income countries were 
already suffering from debt distress. After Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) and Multilateral Debt 
Relief Initiative (MDRI) debt relief in the 2000s, many poor economies began to borrow again. Debt (as a 
share of GDP) was already increasing prior to the crisis and will increase rapidly as a result of Covid-19 
(Figure 3). Much of the additional debt is not from the traditional donors, but also from China and private 
creditors, thus increasing the non-concessional share of debt. This means that the debt service burden is 
expected to be greater than 20% as total tax revenues for two thirds of low-income economies. Other 
metrics such as debt as a share of export revenues are also increasing rapidly. Some countries such as 
Zambia have had unsustainable debt and have had to default; others such as Ecuador have had to 
restructure their debt. The five countries of interest vary in debt levels, and some such as Sri Lanka face 
major challenges in terms of debt sustainability.  
Figure 3. Increased public debt (% of GDP) and debt service burden (% of tax revenues) 
 
Source: Mustapha (2020), LIE = low-income economies. LIDC = low-income developing countries 
 
3.4.2 Poverty levels 
 
The effects in poorer countries are also different, as they have a large informal sector that is also affected 
in a major way, and levels of poverty are higher, even though they had declined substantially for many 
years. Poverty numbers (extreme poverty) are now expected to increase by between 88 million and 115 
million in 2020 (World Bank, 2020d), setting back poverty reduction by around three years. Figure 4 shows 
how this translates into an increase into global poverty rates. 
 
Figure 4. Global poverty (at $1.90 per head a day), 2015-2021 
 










Many countries also face structural challenges in gender inequalities. Gender equality is defined as a 
situation where all forms of discrimination against women and girls have ended (UNDESA, 2015). The 
expected outcome of this situation would correspond, not only in increased women’s participation or 
targeted policy programmes but also in women having greater control over resources (Elson, 1995). 
Progress on gender equality has been slow and fragile. The most recent reporting of the High Level 
Political Forum, which monitors the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), finds 274 legal reforms have 
been passed in the past decade to support gender equality, there are more girls in school than ever before 
and maternal mortality is decreasing (UN, 2020). But much still needs to be done for women’s 
empowerment – both economic and social: the OECD (2019) estimates that, at the current rate of change, 
it will take another 200 hundred years, equivalent to about nine generations, to achieve gender equality. 
Furthermore, the Covid-19 crisis has reversed progress achieved to date while further entrenching 
inequalities. Evidence has started to emerge that, during the pandemic, cases of domestic violence have 
increased by 30% in some countries, and that women have disproportionately borne additional unpaid 
care work during lockdowns (three times as much as their male partner) while their jobs are 1.8 times 
more at risk than men’s owing to the crisis (Azcona et al., 2020; McKinsey, 2020; UNDESA, 2020). Hence, 
a gender-sensitive recovery economic plan is key to ensuring women are not left behind in this crisis. 
 
Box 2. Macroeconomic policies and gender 
Coordinated macroeconomic policies may support gender equality. Indeed, macroeconomic policies are not 
gender-blind and their distributional impact is different depending on gender and socioeconomic status. Gender-
responsive macroeconomic policies can affect paid and unpaid work and rebalance outcomes or deepen existing 
inequalities for women. Furthermore, macroeconomic policies that invest in gender equality raise economy-wide 
productivity, which can create fiscal space, and hence be self-sustaining. The mechanisms through which fiscal, 
monetary and trade policies can act on reducing the gender gap are outlined below: 
o Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy is a tool to stabilise the macro-economy and can be used to promote full employment. Government 
spending can support employment levels and create the conditions for women to be working in secure and 
decent jobs at a decent wage and in decent working conditions. This can take many forms and encompass state 
work programmes and retraining programmes but also provision of childcare and other care work that befalls on 
women, tighter regulations and enforcement of employment laws.  
o Monetary policy 
Monetary policy can promote gender equality via credit availability to women entrepreneurs. Selective credit 
targeting with lowered interest rates and collateral requirements can expand access to credit for women 
entrepreneurs. In turn, this increased activity in the real economy can trigger job growth as productive assets 
are more accessible to women. Here, there is a case to make for coordinated monetary and fiscal policy so that 
government spending supports credit availability to enable decent job creation. 
o Trade policy 
Trade liberalisation creates or destroys jobs across production sectors and affects relative prices. This affects 
women differently depending on their socioeconomic status, which will determine their exposure to job losses or 
uptake of job opportunities and to a relative price change. Given that women in low-income countries represent 
a large share of the unskilled labour force, liberalisation in exports of unskilled labour-intensive goods can create 
more employment at fixed wages for women, while workers in import-competing sectors may need adjustment 
support. 








Table 5 (with data for the country case study) reviews indicators that provide background as to the current 
situation on gender equality: 
• The Social Institutions and Gender Index (SIGI) of the OECD is a measure of discrimination against 
women in social institutions across four dimensions: discrimination in the family, restricted physical 
integrity, restricted access to productive and financial resources and restricted civil liberties. 0% 
indicates no discrimination; 100% corresponds to very high discrimination based on gender. World 
average discrimination in social institutions is 29% [8%–64%] (methodology is available in SIGI, 
2019).  
• The United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Gender Inequality Index measures a 
complementary dimension of gender equity focusing on empowerment (education rate and political 
representation), labour market participation and reproductive health. The index ranges between 0 
and 1, with higher values indicating higher inequalities (UNDP, 2019).  
• Gender gaps in labour participation rates owing to social norms and barriers hinder economic 
growth. For example, it is estimated that, if the gender gap in labour participation rate between men 
and women is reduced by 25%, then the GDP growth in 2025 would be 9.2% higher in Southern 
Asia and 2.2% higher in Sub-Saharan Africa (ILO, 2017). 
 
Table 5. Rapid review of indicators related to gender equality 
 SIGI (OECD, 
2019) 
Gender Inequality Index 
(UNDP, 2019) 
Gender gap in labour force participation rates in 
number of points (ILO, 2017) 
Bangladesh 55% 0.536 46.8 
Kenya 35% 0.545 6.1 
Peru 24% 0.381 15.5 
Sri Lanka 43% 0.38 39 
Tanzania 46% 0.539 7.9 
World 29% 0.439 26.5 
Note: For all indicators, a higher figure indicates higher gender inequality. 
These indicators provide contextual background to the recovery interventions. Bangladesh is a country 
with deeply entrenched unequal social norms, which is reflected across three indicators. Kenya and 
Tanzania present a relatively similar profile and score relatively well compared with the world average on 
women’s participation in the workforce. Peru and Sri Lanka score below the world average on issues 
related to empowerment. 
Beyond the basic human rights aspects, gender equality or inequality has positive or negative 
repercussions for the economy and countries’ income. Indeed, if gender parity in social institutions was 
achieved by 2030, it is estimated that world GDP would increase by 0.4% every year until then (OECD, 
2019a). Hence, the measured gender inequality presented above translates into lost economic growth. A 
gender equality drive could leverage growth for recovery. 
 
3.4.4 Climate change 
 
Another driver of worsening inequalities is climate change. The global and almost simultaneous lockdown 
resulted in a small decrease in greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions that has not altered the course of the 
planet’s climate – on track to increase by at least 1.5oC by 2100 (IPCC, 2018). Indeed, estimates show 
that the effect expected from the worldwide lockdown would correspond to 0.01oC cooling effect by 2030 
(Forster et al., 2020). In other words, adaptation and unlocking low carbon development pathways remains 







Table 6 reviews vulnerability and adaptation to climate change in case study countries and the climate 
finance flows received by each country for the year 2018.  
• The Notre-Dame Global Adaptation Initiative (ND-GAIN) index (2018) is composed of an indicator 
evaluating countries’ vulnerability to climate change and of one assessing ‘readiness’ to leverage 
investment for adaptation. The vulnerability assessment considers food, water, health, ecosystem 
services, human habitat and infrastructure, while the readiness to adapt assesses economic, 
governance and social enabling environment. A low score indicates poor performance.  
• Climate finance for mitigation and adaptation actions as reported in OECD (2018) includes official 
development assistance, other official flows, private grants and private amounts. The data is for 
year 2018.  
Table 6. Selected indicators related to climate change 
 ND GAIN Index Climate finance received in 2018 ($ billion) 
  Adaptation Mitigation 
Bangladesh 36           1.27           0.26  
Kenya 37.5           0.42           0.32  
Peru 48.8           0.28           0.23  
Sri Lanka 46.1           0.14           0.05  
Tanzania 38           0.24           0.22  
Non-OECD countries n.r.         31.95         52.44  
 
Bangladesh, Kenya and Tanzania all have high level of vulnerability to climate change and a low level of 
readiness to adapt. Peru and Sri Lanka both have high vulnerability but also a high level of readiness to 
channel adaptation. The countries studied, together, receive about 7% of global climate finance for 
mitigation and adaptation investments. 
 
3.4.5 Multiple risks 
 
Climate change impacts reinforce already existing socioeconomic vulnerabilities and other stresses. The 
climate shock intersects with issues related to poverty, migration, gender, health, social exclusion and 
Box 3. Macroeconomic policies and climate change 
Climate risks impact the macro-economy as climate-related physical, transitional and liability risks can affect 
output, investment and productivity, triggering negative consequences for livelihoods and prosperity. 
Conversely, macroeconomic policies can shift the economy towards a low-carbon and resilient economic 
development pathway. 
• Fiscal policy 
Fiscal policy can support less GHG emission-intensive sectors over high GHG intensity ones. For example, 
fiscal policy can support renewable energy projects over carbon-dependent ones such as coal power plants, 
thus contributing to the decarbonisation of the country’s economic output. 
• Monetary policy 
Central banks and supervisors, by modifying regulatory frameworks, can steer investment fund allocation in 
projects and activities that emit low levels of GHG emissions. The regulator can take micro and macro prudential 
measures to align collateral frameworks and banks’ portfolios with climate goals. 
• Trade policy 
Trade policies can support specific goods and services and processes such as standards that are low carbon 
or that can enhance the adaptive capacity of specific sectors (e.g. climate-smart agricultural technology).  







age. Covid-19 has further exacerbated any vulnerability groups, already marginalised by socioeconomic 
conditions reinforced by climate change. Preliminary evidence points to an increased number of people 
falling into extreme poverty globally, with women disproportionately affected. The pandemic is projected 
to push an additional 96 million persons into extreme poverty, of which 47 million are women and girls, 
bringing the total number of women living in extreme poverty to 247 million by 2021, compared with 236 
million men (Azcona et al., 2020). 
Among the many overlapping stresses, Figure 5 shows poverty hot spots where climate and conflict risks 
intersect. The share of poor people in countries with a history of conflict and in countries with flood risk is 
high in some countries. The Covid-19 shock that has come on top of this is one further problem to address. 
The five countries of interest may also face such overlapping risks. 
 
Figure 5. Poverty hotpots where conflict and climate risks overlap 
 
 
Source: World Bank (2020) 
 
3.5 The Covid-19 baseline: background indicators for country level 
assessments 
 
Considering the above, the Covid-19 baseline at country level consists of: 
• Economic indicators. Current, past and projected GDP, sectoral structure of economies including 
sector employment and productivity, trade, balance of payments, fiscal balance and government 
debt, macroeconomic policies so far, initial macro projections. This includes high frequency 
indicators (Appendix 3) and long-term structural variables.  
• Social indicators. Employment by group, gender and type of work, income inequality, gender 
inequalities. Apart from recent household surveys, many indicators are structural indicators that 
are not easily measured with high frequency (though see Appendix 3 on social trackers).  
• Environmental indicators. Climate risks and vulnerability assessments at sectoral level to evaluate 
exposure of a policy choice to climate risks (e.g. flood risks of investing in a given hard 







4. ANCHORING FURTHER MACROECONOMIC POLICY 
RESPONSES  
 
A major step in the methodology is policy design. We envisage two broad policy anchors (Section 4.1), a 
fast recovery and building back better,  in which specific policy simulation can be designed, consisting of 
fiscal, monetary and trade policies (Section 4.2). Section 4.3 brings the policy descriptions together and 
provides policy options at the country level, linking with country experts. 
 
4.1 Broad policy anchors 
 
We envisage two broad policy anchors (see Table 7): (i) a fast recovery and (ii) building back better (BBB), 
or Rainbow Recovery.  Countries can adopt a range of measures in response to the unprecedented 
macroeconomic challenges of Covid-19. Some of these are intended to achieve as fast a recovery as 
possible. Others are intended to achieve specific policy objectives, such as those envisaged in BBB in 
order to support broader advancement of the SDGs as well as the implementation and strengthening of 
commitments made under the Paris Agreement. An intersection of these policies can both achieve a fast 
recovery and contribute to a better, more equal and more sustainable future. 
Policy-makers are tasked with returning to pre-Covid-19 levels of production and trade in order to mitigate 
the severe economic effects unleashed by Covid-19, but there is also a commitment to addressing the 
root causes of economic and environmental vulnerabilities, including through addressing sustainability and 
developmental concerns enshrined within the SDGs. From a BBB perspective, it is crucial for the longer 
term not to lock in unsustainable or inequality reinforcing measures in the current recovery, even though 
short-term popular pressures may favour those.  
Table 7. Policy anchors 
Fast (short-term) recovery BBB/rainbow recovery 
This policy anchor involves getting the economy 
recovering faster in the short term (and back to where 
it was before crisis) but without much consideration of 
the longer-term implications (in economic, social and 
environmental terms). 
It focuses on (general) macroeconomic policies with 
some targeted protection to benefit short-term 
economic interests. 
This policy anchor aims for a better recovery that 
considers not only long-term economic outcomes but 
also social outcomes (especially gender) and 
environmental outcomes. 
It includes macroeconomic policies, especially those 
aimed at BBB.  
It focuses on higher local value addition, which is 
greener and more inclusive over the long term.  
It embeds climate and gender objectives from the outset 
is critical.  
 
4.2 Designing policy simulations of specific macroeconomic policy packages 
 
4.2.1 Fiscal policy options 
 
Fiscal policies for the fast recovery increase the magnitude of the fiscal response, without considering the 
impact on fiscal sustainability, and allocate these to households and sectors in the same way as they have 
been allocated previously. For the BBB/rainbow recovery, the focus of the stimulus is on sectors that 
contribute to diversification, human capital, gender equality, digitalisation and renewable energy, and 






With limited fiscal resources as discussed in Section 2, governments face competing priorities of financing 
immediate needs of the health systems and affected economic sectors, and of employing transformative 
measures to mitigate the pandemic’s long-term economic scarring effect from increased unemployment 
and poverty, and disruptions in production and human capital accumulation. This is illustrated in the case 
of Kenya, where the first tranche of the rescue package comprised mainly a red stimulus. While the second 
tranche started to consider blue (e.g. infrastructure) and green (e.g. improving environment, water, 
sanitation) (Figure 6, right hand side), this remains substantially small ($180 million) compared with the 
total red stimulus ($2.3 billion) (Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. From largely ‘red’ (state interventionist) fiscal stimulus to ‘rainbow’ stimulus 
 
Data source: State House of Kenya 
 
Thus, it is critical for governments to identify and tailor fiscal measures that have the highest multiplier 
effects and can result in most positive, transformative and sustainable economic outcomes (BBB).  
 
4.2.2 Monetary and financial policy options 
 
A protracted U-shaped global growth recovery could occur with isolated regional spread of Covid-19. The 
associated ‘uncertainty shock’ (Bloom, 2009) would continue to weigh on potential growth owing to the 
economic interruption. Regional outbreaks also suggest supply chain disruptions that would mean 
continued loss of foreign exchange revenue from exports and remittances. This would be particularly 
harmful for small, open and indebted economies, given that selective risk aversion would also hurt 
investment inflows – necessitating further rate cuts and targeted credit easing. It is likely that countries 
with an already high debt overhang would see their NPL positions worsen. To the extent that countries are 
able to withstand the inflationary effects of currency depreciation, more rate cuts would be warranted and 
further targeted credit to enterprises in hardest-hit sectors. In this context, there are two types of policy 
options: 
• Fast recovery/business as usual. The first policy scenario is one in which central banks 
implement monetary policy in order to return their respective economies back to a pre-Covid-19 
growth path, largely using conventional and previously used monetary policy tools. Under a 
baseline assumption of a U-shaped global macroeconomic recovery, these policies would entail a 
combination of further rate cuts, enhanced quantitative easing, and, in more extreme cases where 
there is limited policy space, accessing IMF and bilateral donor funding.  
• Building back better entails a policy package that both returns economies back to their pre-Covid-
19 growth path but does so within a context of greater gender equity and resilience to climate 
change. The pandemic has put women in particular in a vulnerable position given their roles in the 





















Kenya: First economic stimulus, March 2020
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to public investment in the care economy, and to green finance, with central banks providing low-
cost credit to stimulate private investment.  
We examine examples of these policy options in each of the country contexts in Appendix 1. 
 
4.2.3 Trade and production policy 
 
We also distinguish between two types of trade and production policies. In the fast recovery, trade policies 
may succumb to protectionist tendencies. This may involve, for example, increasing economic activity in 
the short run by protecting domestic firms from foreign competition. This helps increase competitiveness 
in the local market of domestic firms in the short run. As a consequence of this focus on protection, 
efficiency and productivity do not grow, and local firms struggle to become internationally competitive. A 
focus on delivering short-term economic growth excludes considerations of developing greener and 
climate-friendly sectors. A comprehensive BBB/rainbow scenario with a focus on international 
competitiveness and social and climate objectives considers climate and socioeconomic development 
gains from a longer-term perspective. Table 8 provides some examples of policies in each of the scenarios. 
Appendix 2 provides further detail.  
 
Table 8. Trade policy options in the two policy anchors 
Fast recovery BBB, rainbow recovery 
Import restrictions (high tariffs, non-automatic 
import licences, abuse of contingent protection, 
increase of non-tariff barriers (NTBs) based on 
health grounds)  
Reduction of import measures aimed to increase 
efficiency  
Strategic devaluation of exchange rate and/or 
creation of segregated exchange rate markets  
Targeted support to environmental/climate-friendly 
sector, products, processes and technologies  
Prioritisation of domestic suppliers in 
government procurement  
Measures to facilitate trade and investment  
Tax incentives for labour-intensive and 
traditional sectors  
Trade agreements aimed at increasing market 
access and domestic efficiency  
Trade agreements aimed at increasing mutual 
trade diversion 
Government intervention aimed at coordinating 
actions towards transformation of the economy and 
the adoption of climate-friendly practices  
Incentives to the development of local/regional 
supply chains with little efficiency consideration 
Measures to increase women’s participation and 
increase their labour supply  
More government intervention in the domestic 
economy aimed at boosting economic activity 
(e.g. price-setting)  
  
Greater reliance on domestic savings (lower 




















4.3 Policy matrix: summary and country applications  
 
Table 9 summarises the main policies considered in this section, divided into the two policy anchors. 
Table 9. Possible additional policy responses to Covid-19  
  Back to business as usual 
asap, fast recovery term) 
Building back better/rainbow recovery 
Fiscal policy  Additional fiscal stimulus (e.g. 
5% of GDP), allocated to 
sectors as previously (e.g. 
general tax relief) 
Focus stimulus on renewable energy, sectors for 
diversification, human capital, gender, digitalisation 
Financial policy Further interest rate cuts, 
enhanced quantitative easing, 
accessing donor funding 
Central banks providing low-cost credit to stimulate private 
investment (specific sectors, small and medium 
enterprises, climate); moral persuasion on climate change 
Trade policy and 
production Trade 
and production  
Protecting growth in (politically 
aligned) domestic production 
through tariffs, NTBs and 
procurement  
Open trade and investment rules; trade facilitation 
(including for environmental goods and services); target 
value addition in local production relevant for economic 
transformation, green growth and female economic 
empowerment 
It will not be possible to analyse all policies in each country. It is likely that there is a need for detailed 
analyses of some policies that are currently being considered by policy-makers in the specific country 
context. Based on discussions with experts in countries, Table 10 summarises the key policies we are 
likely to analyse. 
Table 10. Macroeconomic policy responses to Covid-19: country options 
 Back to business as 
usual asap, fast 
recovery  
Building back better / Rainbow recovery 
Fiscal policy  Kenya: Increased 
stimulus as previously 
implemented (e.g. for 
households only) 
Sri Lanka: Stimulus of 
5% of GDP as 
previously indicated 
Kenya: Stimulus targeted at sectors with high economic or green 
multipliers, e.g. a life fund for business or a social/green fund 
Kenya: Better consideration of how fiscal stimulus is being financed 
(fiscal consolidation) 
Sri Lanka: Improved macro management (e.g. fiscal vulnerabilities, 
trimming a bloated public sector, improving tax administration, a debt 
standstill with private creditors and China, and a new IMF programme) 
and creating space for a fiscal stimulus; Policies for low carbon 
transition (increasing renewable energy investments, carbon taxes and 
improving public transport) 
Bangladesh: fiscal stimulus that promotes exports and value addition 
(with consideration of how it has been raised) 
Peru: Fiscal stimulus that reaches the informal sector and promotes 
green industrialisation and agricultural value chains 
Tanzania: manage public debt stocks, targeted support for MSMEs and 
digitalisation, and social protection   
Financial 
policy 
Kenya: More general 
financial liquidity 
constrained in use 
Kenya: More targeted liquidity while dealing with NPL issues; lifting of 
interest rate cap 
Sri Lanka: Creating a resilient financial sector (e.g. reducing losses at 
state banks, consolidation of non-bank financial institutions, stock 
market reforms, and a new development bank for the poor) 










substitution in garments 
(ban second-hand 
clothing, more NTB, 
food) 
Sri Lanka: import 
substitution 
Tanzania: support 
domestic production  
Kenya: Focus on integration, trade facilitation, free trade agreements 
with the US, promoting investment in diversification and manufacturing, 
retooling factories for personal protective equipment (PPE) 
Tanzania: Enhanced regional integration. Strategic plans on production 
to realise regional investment plans for more value addition; better 
trade facilitation; targeting exports and trade   
Sri Lanka: Enhanced trade and FTA strategy (limits to import 
substitution, streamlining the import regime, surveillance of non-tariff 
measures in overseas markets, and concluding FTAs with Asian 
trading partners), Promoting domestic agriculture and food security 
(increasing agricultural productivity, reducing post-harvest losses, and 
better distribution), Fostering inclusion and social protection (safer 
transport and childcare to boost female labour market participation, 
better targeting of social protection and a national pension scheme) 
Peru: promoting exports of high value-added agricultural goods  























5 ASSESSING POSSIBLE ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS OF POLICY RESPONSES 
 
This section discussed how to assess the possible economic, social and environmental impacts of 
macroeconomic policy responses. This involves constructing a causal chain analysis from policy changes 
to impacts. We first discuss socioeconomic impacts (Section 5.1), before moving onto gender impacts 
(Section 5.2) and climate impacts (Section 5.3). Section 5.4 summarises the methodologies 
 
5.1 Assessing the economic impacts of fiscal, monetary and trade policies 
 
5.1.1 Fiscal policies 
 
Most country studies will analyse an increased fiscal stimulus aimed at building back better. The economic 
effects depend on the size of the stimulus, how it is being financed (including the opportunity costs) and 
how it is being used. For example, public investment multipliers tend to be large in countries that are less 
open to trade, with fixed exchange rate regimes, or where central banks have hit their effective lower 
bound (Ilzetzki et al., 2013; Chodorow-Reich, 2019, as cited in IMF, 2020c). Countries with a low initial 
stock of public capital (as a proportion of GDP) also have significantly higher public investment multipliers 
than countries with a high initial stock of public capital, suggesting that public investment in developing 
countries would carry high returns (Izquierdo, et al., 2019). Fiscal multipliers are much higher during 
downturns (Gechert and Rannenberg, 2018). 
Meanwhile, multiplier effects are lower in countries with a weak fiscal position (e.g. a high level of public 
debt) since households lower their consumption in the expectations of fiscal consolidation and resulting 
increased borrowing costs from investor concerns on sovereign risk (Huidrom et al., 2019). For low-income 
country contexts in particular, if funding of public investment is sourced externally (e.g. aid), the multiplier 
effect is reduced as a result of real exchange appreciation and the subsequent negative impact on trade 
(Shen et al., 2015).  
Public investment has the potential to boost growth and increase employment, with larger short-term 
multipliers than public consumption, taxes or transfers, and with medium- to long-term multipliers 
estimated to be larger than 1.0 (Abiad et al., 2016; Gechert and Rannenberg, 2018; IMF, 2020a). In the 
long term, public investment expansions (e.g. in the form of infrastructure) can also help reduce inequality 
especially in low-income countries, by increasing productivity, facilitating labour mobility and fostering 
structural transformation(Fabrizio et al., 2017; McMillan et al., 2017). 
Recent IMF (2020c) estimates show that an unanticipated positive shock to public investment of 1% of 
GDP increases the level of output by between 0.25% and 0.5% in the first year, with a larger effect after 
two years (above 2.0) in periods of higher uncertainty.  
It is important to identify the sector for which public investment can gain positive outcomes in the context 
of developing countries. IMF (2020c) estimates that public investment in water and sanitation and 
electricity displays greater job intensity than that in roads, schools and hospitals (Figure 7). Public 
investment in clean energy infrastructure can also be labour-intensive and create large employment in the 
short term, and is likely to crowd in private investment, but some jobs require specific skills, and this is not 








Figure 7. Job intensity per $1 million of additional public investment 
  
Source: IMF (2020c) 
In terms of stimulating private investments, IMF (2020c) estimates show that public investment in the 
environment, health and social, and entertainment sectors can result in higher impacts on private 
investment than from public investments in other sectors. An increase in public investment will crowd in 
most investments in construction, communication and manufacturing sectors (Figure 8). 
Figure 8. Effect of public investment on private firms’ net investment 
(Effect, in percentage change, of an increase of public investment by 1 percent; one-year horizon, by 
sector of operation of firms) 
 
Source: IMF (2020c) 
As the pandemic is changing the shape of the recovery (e.g. more opportunities for e-commerce, 
shortening of global value cains, increasing domestic resilience and food security), governments will also 
need to allocate resources on physical and human capital according to post-pandemic production and 
employment requirements. Higher human capital, in the form of investment to improve education, will 
complement the increased utilisation of technologies and physical capital. Indeed, returns to education are 
especially high when technology is changing (World Bank, 2018), and this will be highlight relevant as 
economies continue to improve digital infrastructure in order to implement socially distanced production 
and working-from-home arrangements until a large part of the population gets vaccinated.  
A fiscal stimulus has links with monetary and trade policies and outcomes. For example, in Bangladesh, 
part of the government stimulus is allocated to promoting exports. Sectoral support can be effective in 
increasing value addition, ramping up productivity and raising competitiveness and exports. Often, 
because governments are constrained fiscally, monetary options are used instead. But the use of fiscal 
stimulus has also had macro-stability implications and badly focused monetary expansions can lead to 
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5.1.2 Monetary policies 
 
A country’s monetary policy response is crucial in underpinning economic recovery. Its effectiveness is 
often heightened during financial crises: if implemented quickly, it can have larger and quicker effects on 
output and inflation during recession (Jannsen et al., 2019). For emerging and developing economies, the 
macroeconomic uncertainty associated with the pandemic is likely to have impaired monetary 
transmission. Both developing and developed country central banks have cut policy rates, in many cases, 
to historic lows. They have also provided additional liquidity, including through open market operations 
and have instituted swap line arrangements. 
Typically, the first transmission mechanism of monetary policy works through the official interest rate, 
which is larger the deeper the financial markets and the more sensitive investment and consumption is to 
rate changes. This rate then influences both money market rates and expectations. It is changes in the 
market rates that affect behaviour (such as bank deposit rates and inflation expectations). Therefore, the 
ability of the central bank to influence economic agents’ behaviour depends on the interaction between 
official and market interest rates (Mariscal Biefang-Frisancho, and Howells, 2002). Changes in the money 
market rate, and in expectations, then feed through, to varying degrees, to asset prices, money, credit, 
bank rates and the exchange rate. The subsequent adjustment in supply and demand in both goods 
markets and the labour market will adjust with domestic wages and consumer prices. Changes in the 
official interest rate can have bigger or smaller effects depending on any one, or several, of these channels. 
If there is a large exchange rate reaction to an adjustment in interest rates (one which was unexpected), 
there could be a larger impact on imported prices and on overall inflation prospects.   
Following the Covid-19 pandemic and its economic consequences, both developed and developing 
economies have implemented targeted unconventional monetary policy measures. These measures have 
sought to offset any impairments in the transmission mechanisms of monetary policy in the wake of the 
current economic recession. A dimension of the pandemic is that it also constitutes a deep economic 
shock: changes in fiscal policy have been accompanied by monetary policy adjustments. Most Sub-
Saharan African central banks have opted to cut interest rates and to provide liquidity directly to sectors 
that are the most affected, whereas others have effectively started to monetise their fiscal deficits. This 
type of quantitative easing could circumvent any resistance in banks’ willingness to lend – a key channel 
for conventional policy. If it is low, perhaps because of risk aversion, an interest rate change would have 
a smaller impact on actual lending, and consequently little influence on the real sector of the domestic 
economy. 
The raft of unconventional measures notwithstanding, impaired credit transmission mechanisms amid the 
current pandemic could hinder policy stimulus in some emerging markets (Barajas et al., 2013; Mishra et 
al., 2016; Abuka et al., 2019). Effective liquidity provision could be hampered by high debt levels and the 
ongoing resolution of NPLs.3 What’s more, the current pandemic’s economic fallout is likely to bring about 
an increase in NPLs. Such an eventuality has tended to depress loan growth and the scope for economic 
recovery (Aiyar et al., 2015; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2015). Typically, NPL levels peak at about 20% of total 
loans. And yet, in developing countries in particular, they can exceed and have exceeded 50% of total 
loans. They are a defining feature of crises: only less than a fifth of banking crises avoid high NPL levels 
(exceeding 7% of total loans). The current context is heightened by emerging markets seeing the sharpest 
portfolio flow reversal on record – about $100 billion or 0.4% of their GDP (Adrian and Natalucci, 2020). 
Trade policies  
A protectionist and short-term response to economic downturns involves restricting trade and reserves the 
domestic market for domestic producers. This could be effective as long as there is significant competition 
in the domestic market. However, in small countries, this approach has obvious limits because of the 
upward pressures on domestic prices through inefficient production. As prices increase, growth in demand 
 
 






slows and so does the recovery. Moreover, the measure affects the competitiveness of domestic firms in 
foreign markets by increasing input costs.  
A BBB and long-run approach involves a substantially more open trade regime. Such a trade policy 
contributes significantly to the economic recovery by lifting barriers and reducing costs associated with 
exporting and importing. On the export side, measures aimed at streamlining operations in ports and 
borders can reduce transport costs and times of products exported. This affects competitiveness of 
domestic products in other markets. The elimination of taxes and restrictions on exports also have an 
important effect.  
However, the most important channel through which trade policy operates is competitiveness and 
productivity of domestic firms operating in the domestic market. Actions aimed at reducing barriers to 
foreign competition can affect competitiveness when barriers are reduced in inputs and intermediate 
products. The reduction of tariffs and other trade facilitation measures reduce the marginal costs of 
intermediate inputs, leading to increases in output. This translates into more sectoral value addition and, 
eventually, general economic activity.  
When barriers are reduced, increased foreign supply leads to an increase in competition in the domestic 
market that raises productivity. Increased competition generates the transformation of the domestic sector 
by increasing the output of efficient firms and decreasing output in inefficient ones. This increases the 
productivity of affected sectors.  
The supply-side impact of trade policy is complemented by the impact on household consumption. The 
reduction of taxes and barriers to imports can generate adjustments in the households’ consumption 
baskets that can lead to increases in demand for other products. As consumer prices fall in certain 
products, households reallocate some of the original budget for these products into other goods and 
services. This leads to a general boost of demand and economic activity.  
Context matters a lot. The economic structure and social and political factors introduce conditions and 
limitations on both the evolution of the economy and the trade policy response. Undiversified and 
commodity-based exports, for example, make countries vulnerable to prices fluctuations. GVC 
governance, on the other hand, introduces additional considerations on the policy space of 
countries to enter into key markets.  
An analysis of the evolution of the export diversification (e.g. Herfindahl index on HS 6 digit exports) as 
well as the product space indicators provides information about the economic transformation process in a 
country. An increase in diversification and a move towards more complex exports support economic 
transformation process associated with building back better. This can be supplemented by additional 
information such as the share of goods trade in GDP, the share of high-technological exports and the 
share of manufacturing in value added.  
Data on trade in goods could be supplemented by data on services. Modern services, in particular, can 
also contribute to the economic transformation process as well as generate a particular type of response 
of the economy. A high share of services exports, dependent on the trade (e.g. transport), or tourism can 
indicate a special vulnerability in the current Covid-19 crisis. Consequently, a series of indicators that 
capture the importance of services in the economy and in trade, as well as specific types of services, can 
also help illustrate how the structure of the economy can affect the recovery. In this sense, indicators such 
as the share of services in GDP and on exports and the share of tourism/transport in GDP and 
exports should be considered.  
The governance and structure of value chains bring additional dimensions to the recovery and policy 
response, as a significant component of the recovery may be dependent on decisions made elsewhere. 
Shortening or re-shoring of value chains may be the result of supply decisions made by whoever controls 
the value chains. In this sense, having an idea of the relevance of value chains in the trade of the country 
is of paramount importance. The share of foreign value added in exports can bring information about 
backward linkages and how import-to-export types of value chains may be affected. The share 






While the dynamics of regional value chain participation will be difficult to capture, any trends in changes 
in market orientation at more disaggregated levels should be described. Data on foreign direct investment 
around trends, sectors, origin of investor and destination within export-oriented sectors is also 
important.      
Female participation in the economy can be reflected in the economic structure. The evolution of the 
economic cycle can have particular effects on women depending on the economic structure. In this sense, 
it is critical to capture the participation of women in the economy and in trade. Indicators such as 
employment rates by gender and the share of sectors in exports that employ a disproportionally high 
number of women (e.g. garments) can illustrate the participation of women in trade.   
The structure of the economy and trade is a significant determinant of the climate and environmental 
effects. A high reliance on and growing use of fossil fuels indicate additional costs to be supported 
globally. Information about trade-related emissions can indicate how the recovery may impact the climate 
and the environment.   
A summary of useful structural indicators related to trade is as follows:  
• rate of growth of export and imports  
• share of trade (goods) in GDP  
• share of trade (services) in GDP  
• share of tourism and transport services in GDP and exports  
• evolution of the stock of FDI   
• Herfindhall index of export diversification  
• Haussman product-space   
• share of high-tech in total exports  
• share of foreign value added in exports  
• share of intermediate/inputs in exports  
• share of sectors with high employment of women in exports  
• emissions in exports  
• effectively applied tariff rate  
• time and cost to export and import. 
The following indicators could be used to track the transmission effects of Covid-19 and policy response 
measures.   
• evolution of monthly exports (goods and services), prices and volumes  
• evolution of monthly imports of machinery, parts, equipment and inputs, prices and volumes   
• evolution of commodity prices of both exported and imported goods  
• evolution of monthly travellers’ arrivals  
• evolution of monthly textiles and garments, fresh fruits and cut flowers, to assess the impact on 
women employment  
• data on wages within export-oriented sectors (e.g. garments)   
• evolution of the Grubel-Lloyd index on monthly data in certain chapters. 
• evolution of exports of steel, aluminum, beef and other highly intensive emitting products and the 
imports of fossil fuel to assess the environmental impact.  
 
5.2 Assessing the gender sensitivity of policy response  
 
To act on economic gender inequalities, the policy responses can use different levers, such as social 
protection programmes, labour market measures and fiscal and economic measures. Social protection 
measures can increase women’s ability to seize economic opportunities by acting on unpaid care. Labour 
market measures can increase women’s economic security and open up new opportunities, while fiscal 






sectors and women-owned firms to enhance women’s job and economic security. The macroeconomic 
policy packages here concern fiscal, monetary and trade measures and are examined in turn. 
 
5.2.1 Fiscal stimulus 
 
A fiscal economic stimulus holds the potential to affect gender outcomes since investment spending on 
economic sectors can be where women represent a large share of the labour force. Figure 8 shows there 
is a large difference between female share in accommodation and construction sectors – this also 
suggests that the large drop in tourism owing to the pandemic is disproportionally affecting women. There 
could be a case for primarily targeting sectors hard hit by the pandemic shutdown and that are female-
dominated. In addition, promoting sectors where the labour force is not female-dominated, but which have 
linkages to sectors that are, can also deliver indirect benefits on female empowerment. Furthermore, 
investment in social infrastructure for health and care (i.e. current expenditure such as wages of school 
teachers, nurses, etc.) rather than physical infrastructure only (i.e. capital expenditure such as building 
schools, roads and hospitals) can also yield multiplier effects for equality that should be considered when 
choosing the target sector for the stimulus (De Henau et al., 2017).  
Having an assessment of the employment structure per sector cross-checked with the sectors that the 
pandemic has hit hard can help determine where fiscal stimulus could be channelled. Furthermore, the 
type of job, low-skilled vs low-skilled, permanent vs temporary, fixed vs variable wages, and the working 
conditions are also parameters to take into account when assessing the sectors targeted. 
Table 10. Share of women in paid employment, by sector 
Year 2017 2013 2019 2018 2013 
Country Bangladesh Kenya Peru 
Sri 
Lanka Tanzania 
Total for all sectors 24% 36% 40% 34% 32% 
Agriculture; forestry and fishing 14% 37% 27% 39% 37% 
Mining and quarrying 3% 19% 8% 4% 10% 
Manufacturing 32% 28% 30% 44% 19% 
Electricity; gas, steam and air conditioning 
supply 9% 27% 5% 11% 3% 
Water sanitation utilities 28% 34% 22% 28% 22% 
Construction 8% 18% 5% 2% 5% 
Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor 
vehicles and motorcycles 14% 25% 44% 20% 20% 
Transportation and storage 9% 16% 17% 6% 18% 
Accommodation and food service activities 21% 35% 65% 24% 60% 
Information and communication 10% 38% 34% 31% 22% 
Financial and insurance activities 18% 44% 50% 47% 15% 
Real estate activities 7% 42% 35% 0% 56% 
Professional, scientific and technical activities 13% 28% 49% 41% 49% 
Administrative and support service activities 15% 25% 35% 31% 19% 
Public administration and defence 15% 35% 34% 34% 29% 
Education 40% 42% 58% 68% 44% 
Human health and social work activities 50% 60% 69% 66% 60% 
Arts, entertainment and recreation 17% 36% 38% 23% 19% 
Other services 25% 38% 47% 29% 48% 
Activities of households for own use 78% 63% 95% 40% 72% 
Activities of extraterritorial organisations and 
bodies 13% 27% n.a. 57% 28% 
Other 45% n.a. n.a. n.a. 28% 
Source: Calculations based on ILOSTAT, 2021, employees by sex and economic activity (‘000s) – annual 
Finally, if the stimulus involves a direct cash transfer programme, these can also directly support women 






of household’, most often this will be a male household member and intra-household dynamics may 
preclude spending on women and girls, with the result that the cash programme may reach them less. 
 
 
5.2.2 Monetary and financial stimulus 
 
Monetary and financial policy packages affect credit and lending and, if accessible, can directly support 
female-led households and female-owned enterprises. Designing specific provisions to ensure women 
can access credit and low-cost lending schemes is key in ensuring this policy package reaches them. This 
can take the form of reduced difficulty in getting a loan, such as requiring for women lower levels of 
collaterals doubled with an awareness campaign about this change. Barriers to women accessing finance, 
however, may vary by country context and social norms and should be analysed to provide provisions that 
match the difficulty women experience. 
 
 
5.2.3 Trade measures 
 
Supporting trade in female-dominated sectors can feed into increased job security for women. Liberalising 
trade could in the long run favour women in the services sector but impact those in the manufacturing 
sector, while moves towards greater protectionism (from import restrictions to direct prioritisation of 
domestic production) may hold short-term benefits but ultimately will yield low long-term benefits.  
Consequently, two main questions can guide the impact assessment of policy packages in view of gender 
equality advancement: (i) what are the female-dominated sectors, so that the policy packages can target 
them? and (ii) what are the specific provisions needed to ensure women can access the policy packages? 
The answer to these two questions will be context-specific, and each case study should analyse where 
women work (i.e. which economic sectors) and what barriers women face in accessing cash transfer 
programmes and financial credit so that specific provisions lowering these barriers can be applied. 
Figure 9. Steps for gender-responsive macroeconomic recovery measure assessment 
 
A gender responsive macroeconomic policy package would seek to directly address the economic 
challenges faced by women by supporting female-dominated economic sectors and ensuring women can 







5.3 Assessing the climate sensitivity of policy response  
 
The macroeconomic policy packages can shape the recovery to be resilient and low carbon by acting on 
the type of investment the stimulus is allocated to and which sectors receive credit and are supported by 
trade measures. These levers, along with greater climate ambitions as countries submit their Nationally 
Determined Contributions at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, can have a 
sustainable impact on the recovery pathway. 
 
5.3.1 Fiscal stimulus 
 
The sector allocation of spending holds the potential to support or hinder investment that could either 
improve climate resilience or rather lock countries in carbon dependency pathways. This may have long-
term consequences. A fiscal stimulus that includes infrastructure investment would need to be climate-
informed. Infrastructure project feasibility would include climate information so that climate change impacts 
would not diminish the infrastructure’s expected benefits. For a hydropower dam, this means including 
rainfall and runoff under climate change to ensure the project is viable at more than 10 years. For a road 
network, this means assessing the risk of floods and landslides under increased precipitations for the 
proposed route. Furthermore, a climate-compatible fiscal stimulus would not allocate spending to carbon-
intensive projects such as coal power plants. Similarly, a bail-out could be made conditional to 
environmental performance. 
5.3.2 Monetary and financial stimulus 
 
In the case of financial stimulus, conditionality of access to low-cost credit can ensure that low-carbon 
over carbon-intensive enterprises and sectors are supported, or that the loan would need to serve for 
transitioning to low-carbon production processes. In other words, avoiding a blanket rule but ensuring 
provisions to either support already low-carbon sectors or sectors that, given investment, could be low 
carbon, would help support long-term decarbonised development pathways. 
Dikau et al (2020) suggest that financial authorities and central banks can focus on the following areas to 
enhance environmental impact 
• Collateral frameworks: The underlying risk assessment for collateral frameworks could be 
adjusted to better account for climate change-related and other environmental risks.  
• Asset purchases, refinancing operations and crisis facilities: Central banks could better align their 
asset purchases with Paris Agreement goals.  
• Prudential measures: In response to the current expansionary liquidity provision measures and 
the easing of countercyclical regulatory and supervisory instruments, it is necessary to adjust 
prudential measures to avoid a manifestation of transition risks on the balance sheets of financial 
institutions.  
• Management of central bank portfolios: Central banks could adopt sustainable and responsible 
investment principles for portfolio management, including policy portfolios, such as the Principles 
for Responsible Investment (PRI). 
Donors could also be encouraged to provide debt relief linked to a green and inclusive recovery (Volz et 
al, 2019) and consider issues such as debt for nature swaps. 
 
5.3.3 Trade measures 
 
Trade measures could support climate-compatible economic activities like the digital economy and 






environmental goods and services would provide countries the opportunity to move towards a low-carbon 
economy. 
As a result, climate-responsive macroeconomic recovery can be guided by the issue of conditionality either 
of access or of performance in the case of credit or bail-out, and by the issue of ensuring clean 
development projects is supported over carbon-intensive ones.  
5.4 Summarising policy impact pathways 
 
Table 11 summarises a range of critical considerations when assessing the main impact pathways. 
 
Table 11. Assessing the impact of macroeconomic policies  
  Main policy 
area 







The level and 
sectoral and 
distributional focus of 
spending 
Multiplier and indirect 
effects (including on 
trade, and climate 
change), which 
depend on e.g. level 
of initial public capital 
and debt, trade 
openness, elasticity 
of consumption, 
exchange rate regime 
Debt sustainability 
and links with 
financial stability 
Female employment 
intensity of targeted 
sectors  
Direct or indirect 
support to female 
dominated sectors? 
What type of 
employment (fixed 
wage? Safe working 
conditions, skill level) 
prevail in the female-
dominated sectors 
targeted by the 
stimulus?  
What economic sectors 
are targeted by the 
stimulus: are they low 
or high greenhouse 
gas emissions for input 
and production 
process? Are they 
energy-intensive and 
what energy do they 
rely on?  
Are the sectors 
targeted supporting 
adaptation to climate 
change (e.g. climate 
smart agricultural 
technology)? 
Can there be a double dividend where the 
sector supported employs a female labour force 












Reach of targeted 
finance 
Non-performing 
loans, debt levels and 
financial stability 
Conditions of access 




















Impact on trade 







What is the female 
intensity of economic 
sectors and sub-
sectors affected by 
trade policy change? 
Types of goods 
affected by relative 














During the first few months after the start of the Covid-19 pandemic, international organisations began to 
develop a range of trackers covering restrictions on mobility, socioeconomic indicators and economic and 
social policy responses (see Appendix 4). These trackers can be useful to compare, for example, fiscal 
policy responses across countries. However, such trackers cannot be used to assess impacts of policy 
responses. More detailed analyses are required for this.   
Different methods can be used to assess the impact of policy at country level.  
• Causal chain analysis is the most commonly used for policy analyses because of its 
comprehensiveness and relatively quick procedures, and is also likely to be the dominant method 
for country case studies. It involves constructing a causal chain from policy measures via 
intermediate channels to outcome variables. It describes the policy shock and examines the impact 
through behavioural assumptions and an understanding of the structure and context, usually aided 
by tables and charts. It can in principle include many different outcomes variables, including 
economic, social and environmental outcomes. 
• General equilibrium modelling is often used to simulate changes in trade policy (e.g. through the 
Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP)) or a fiscal policy (OECD, IMF). It can be useful in 
understanding the various interactions in an economy and also globally through a set of linkages 
and behavioural equations. Models tend to have a more comprehensive coverage of linkages, but 
may be focused on economic variables, and have less scope to understand gender and climate 
impacts. That said, GTAP can be linked to environmental outcomes, and household surveys can 
be linked to computable general equilibrium models to get disaggregated effects. 
• Econometric methods are often used to assess relationships between variables. This may be 
useful, for example to understand how a change in trade barriers affects productivity. Other 
statistical analyses can be used to understand differences among firms or sectors. 
• Surveys can be used to provide quick up-to-date information about stated impact or stated 
preferences. They are not that easy to implement for a one-off study, unless they are small and 
focused. There are World Bank surveys that can be used. 
• Expert interviews can be very useful ways to obtain deeper insights into policy impacts. 
The appropriateness of each method depends on the context of the question and the country and the 
availability of data and models. Table 12 summarises which methods could be used for which policy 
question. 
Table 12. Assessing impact of macroeconomic policies  
  
Fiscal policy analysis Monetary policy analysis Trade policy analysis 
Causal chain analysis   Yes Yes Yes 
General equilibrium 
modelling  




Econometric methods  Use of multiplier effects  Use of interest rate sensitivity 
analysis  
Use of elasticities  
Surveys  Firm use of stimulus? Are firms liquidity constrained? Do firms face trade 
barriers? 
Expert interviews  Yes Yes Yes 
 
In addition, a range of cross-country or modelling analyses can be undertaken to complement country 
level analyses. For example, several countries are exploring the use of FTAs to promote trade. We will 
use GTAP to examine the economic effects of trade policies and use those to infer social and 
environmental effects. Specific analysis on implications of the shortening of GVCs within selected sectors 
of economic importance for case-studies, including a review of available data and trends may also be 
useful to inform policy implications. Finally, we will examine the gender impact of monetary policies, with 








Effective macroeconomic policy responses to the Covid-19 crisis depend on good policy advice. In order 
to provide policy advice at country level, country researchers need to follow a broad methodology that 
connects to policy-makers and responds to the challenges the country is facing. 
The first task is to construct a Covid-19 baseline, which is not easy because it is a combination of (i) 
current impacts, which are not yet fully measured; (ii) current policy responses (whose impact may not 
have been felt – e.g. there are time lags); and (iii) macroeconomic projections for the coming few years, 
on which there may not be a consensus (e.g. on whether the recovery will be U, L, or V shaped). 
The next task is to select a set of policy responses that are subject to debate in a country context. We 
distinguish between policies that aim for a fast short-term recovery without long-term considerations and 
those that aim for a future that is more transformative, greener and socially more equal. Describing the 
measures is important – for example a fiscal stimulus targeted at a growth sector that may also be climate-
friendly. 
The final task is to use a set of methods such as causal chain analysis to assess the impact of a policy 
measure by taking into account intermediate factors or pathways. For example, the impact of a fiscal 
stimulus depends on the sector (e.g. with large shares of female employment) or whether the economy is 
open so that increased demand leads to much greater imports. The impact of monetary easing depends 
on how additional credit can be absorbed and how sensitive the economy is to interest rate changes. The 
impact of lower trade barriers will depend in part on how this changes prices and firm-level productivity. 
For each policy, the impact assessment should go beyond direct economic effects and consider economic, 
social and environmental over the period 2020–2023. The sections and appendices in this paper will 
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APPENDIX 1: MONETARY POLICY RESPONSES 
 
This appendix discusses country-level monetary and financial policy responses to the COVID19 pandemic. 
It presents a range of variables that can be used to describe the macroeconomic context, and recent 
monetary policy responses in countries such as Bangladesh, Kenya, Peru, Sri Lanka and Tanzania. Within 
each of these country contexts, a number of potential policy scenarios is examined, particularly with 
reference to ‘building back better’ and achieving greater gender equity and resilience to climate change 
risks. 
What has been the scope and nature of the monetary responses thus far 
A country’s monetary policy response is crucial in underpinning economic recovery. Its effectiveness is 
often heightened during financial crises: if implemented quickly, it can have larger and quicker effects on 
output and inflation during recession (Jannsen et al., 2019). For emerging and developing economies, the 
macroeconomic uncertainty associated with the pandemic is likely to have impaired monetary 
transmission. Both developing and developed country central banks have cut policy rates, in many cases, 
to historic lows. They have also provided additional liquidity, including through open market operations 
and have instituted swap line arrangements.  
As with the great financial crisis of 2008-2009, central banks have launched a range of new broad-based 
programs, including to purchase riskier assets such as corporate bonds, in order to stem the cost of credit; 
central banks are ensuring that households and firms continue to have access to credit at an affordable 
price. To date, central banks have announced plans to expand their provision of liquidity—including 
through loans and asset purchases—by at least $6 trillion and have indicated they will do more if needed. 
• Bangladesh Bank (BB) has announced a spate of monetary easing measures to ensure adequate 
liquidity through a series of reductions in its repo rate and in its cash reserve ratios. 4 Lower 
remittances (over 5 percent of GDP in 2019) and lower export revenues from the garment sector 
(over eighty percent of exports) poses risks to the country’s foreign exchange revenues. The Export 
Development Fund was raised to $5 billion, with the interest rate now fixed at 2 percent and the 
refinancing limit increased. BB has created several refinancing schemes including a 360-day repo 
facility and a credit guarantee scheme to support exporters, farmers and SMEs. Foreign exchange 
rules were eased to allow foreign companies to access short-term loans. BB continues to intervene 
in the foreign exchange market to stem weakness in the Taka against the US dollar. 
• Tanzania has seen its central bank undertake a 200bp policy easing; On May 12, the Bank of 
Tanzania (BOT) reduced the discount rate from 7 percent to 5 percent and reduced collateral 
haircuts requirements on government securities. From June 8, the BOT Statutory Minimum 
Reserves requirement was reduced from 7 percent to 6 percent. There has been no confirmed 
foreign exchange intervention by the BOT despite recent currency volatility. NPLs are being 
targeted by the BOT; it has provided regulatory flexibility to banks to restructure its loans and other 
financial institutions that will carry out loan restructuring operations on a case-by-case basis, with 
an aim of protecting jobs and medium, small and micro-enterprises.  
• Kenya has eased monetary policy significantly. The central bank of Kenya has lowered its policy 
rate by 100 bps to 7.25 percent, lowered banks’ cash reserve ratio by 100 bps to 4.25 percent, 
raised the maximum length of repurchase agreements from 28 to 91 days, crucially, plans to 
operationalise the Credit Guarantee Scheme for the vulnerable micro, small and medium-sized 
enterprises (MSMEs). To mitigate the impact on MSMEs, the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) is 
working with banks, Government and development finance institutions (DFIs) on access to 
concessionary and affordable funds. This implementation will take place with a view to re-skilling 
and retooling of MSMEs for when the COVID-19 abates. 
 
 






• Peru has seen historically low interest rates in response to the COVID19 pandemic shock; the 
Central Reserve Bank of Peru (CRBP) cut its policy rate by 200 basis points, bringing it to 0.25 
percent.5 It has reduced the reserve requirement, provided liquidity to the financial system through 
repo operations. Financial institutions have been allowed to change loan terms (those affected by 
the Covid-19 outbreak) without changing classification of the loans. The CRBP approved a 
package (of over 8.8 percent of GDP) in liquidity assistance (backed by government guarantees) 
to support lending. The Reactiva Perú Program has provided loans to impacted businesses: as of 
August 19, a total of 295,708 businesses have received loans within the framework – 97 percent 
of them are small and micro enterprises (SMEs). The CRBP has been intervening since late 
February to mitigate disorderly conditions in the foreign exchange market.  
• Sri Lanka has seen easing which has included the Central Bank of Sri Lanka (CBSL) cutting policy 
rates by 200 basis points since March, cutting the required reserves ratio of commercial banks by 
3 percentage points and cutting the interest rate on CBSL advances 650 bps. The CBSL is 
supporting its reserves through foreign currency purchases and foreign currency swaps with the 
Reserve Bank of India and licensed banks (CBSL, 2020). Capital controls on investment outflows 
and remittances have been instituted, alongside import restrictions of certain goods, including 
agricultural produce and vehicles. The interest rate on credit cards will be capped, for transactions 
up to a certain amount, with a reduction in the minimum monthly repayment. Financial institutions 
are rescheduling NPLs, while loan classification rules have been relaxed.  
Recent developments in key financial indicators 
Typically, the parameters and policy levers of monetary policy include the bank/discount rate, open market 
operations, the variable reserve ratio and changes in liquidity provision. This section presents country-
level monetary policy variables in the context of the country case studies discussed above. The variables 
and framework are discussed in the context of a structural impairment in the countries’ monetary 
transmission mechanisms, particularly in bank lending as is often the case in some emerging markets 
(Barajas et al. 2013, Mishra et al. 2016, Abuka et al. 2019). In this context, monitoring and resolution of 
non-performing loans (NPLs)6 is of key importance when the credit channel is impaired. The current 
pandemic’s economic fallout is likely to bring about an increase in NPLs, which will depress credit growth 
and the scope for economic recovery (Aiyar et al., 2015; Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2015). Typically, NPL levels 
peak at about 20% of total loans on average. And yet, in developing countries in particular, they can and 
have exceeded 50% of total loans in the past. They are a defining feature of crises: only less than a fifth 
of banking crises avoid high NPL levels (defined as exceeding 7% of total loans). The current context is 
heightened by emerging markets seeing the sharpest portfolio flow reversal on record—about $100 billion 
or 0.4 percent of their GDP to date (Adrian and Natalucci, 2020).  
• Bangladesh. NPLs in Bangladesh are at a high level in its private banks, its DFIs and 
predominantly its state-owned banks (ADB, 2019). This is likely to hamper the transmission of 
monetary policy despite the central bank’s measures to stimulate lending. It is clear from the BB 
monetary policy statement, that private sector credit growth and domestic credit growth have fallen 
short of the desired/targeted rate of growth. However, at 12.7%, monetary growth has remained 
close to the target ceiling of 13%. Bangladesh’s currency stance7 poses a risk to its reserves 
position given the deterioration in foreign exchange revenues stemming from the economic 
slowdown. Bangladesh needs to safeguard its foreign exchange reserves. There is likely to be a 
shortfall in foreign exchange revenues from its export earnings. This is likely to make the operation 
of its managed currency policy difficult. 
 
 
5The CRBP operates an inflation targeting regime which explicitly takes its financial dollarization into account. The implementation of its 
framework in its dollarized economy is a combination of a standard interest rate rule setting plus the active use of other instruments (such as 
the reserve requirement ratio) to control financial risks (Rossini et al., 2014).  
6A non-performing loan arises when payments of interest and/or principal are past due by 90 days or more. 
7 In the context of the foreign exchange market, BB has aimed to keep the Taka-Dollar exchange rate competitive, intervened by selling 
USD; To prevent any appreciating pressure on the local currency, BB is currently purchasing foreign exchange from the market while 






• Tanzania. At 10%, Tanzania’s share of NPLs is high and likely to rise if international lines of credit 
are not renewed and further defaults emerge. With less money to lend, banks may limit their regular 
operations, jeopardising financial stability. Additionally, slower growth in Tanzania’s trade partners, 
coupled with the travel ban, reduced demand for its agricultural commodities and final 
manufactured goods and has hurt tourism (over 26 percent of total exports): main tourism operators 
forecast revenue contractions of 80 percent in 2020. However, Tanzania will benefit from lower oil 
prices and higher gold prices, and these price effects, even if the volumes do not change, will 
mitigate the deterioration of Tanzania’s external position. Private consumption and investment 
growth are both expected to have halved from 5.2 percent in 2019 to 2.4 percent in 2020, and from 
8.0 percent to 4.0 percent.  
• Kenya. Unanticipated large-scale community spread of COVID-19 could disrupt domestic 
economic activity more severely, coupled with the risk of the potential for drought. COVID-19 has 
adversely affected the MSMEs. At 13 percent, NPLs are high and rising in the manufacturing and 
trade sectors, due to deteriorating profits. Total loans amounting to 29 percent of total bank loans,) 
have been restructured as of the end of June. Other sectors such as trade (22.9 percent), real 
estate (19.5 percent), transport and communication (16.3 percent) and manufacturing (14.0 
percent) have been restructured. Inflation remains anchored, and though it creeped higher to 5.3% 
in November, it remains below the 7% peak earlier in the year. This is supported by lower food 
prices, the impact of the reduction of VAT and muted demand pressures.8 The exchange rate 
depreciation has been more problematic. It reflects, among other things, an outflow of investment 
from Kenya, owing in part to risk aversion.9 
• Peru has largely seen stability in its monetary aggregates: both money growth has shown resilience 
and inflation is contained at just below 2%. Peru also does not have a high level of NPLs, though 
this could change with the economic fallout associated with the COVID19 pandemic. Peru’s 
dollarization has typically reduced the impact of monetary policy on inflation and the output gap (Rossini 
et al., 2014). Currency depreciation stimulates exports – but it also can trigger a negative impact on the 
financial position of firms with currency mismatches. As a consequence, the expansionary effect of the 
exchange rate channel from an interest rate cut is significantly reduced with a sharp depreciation. 
Dollarization has declined since the implementation of its inflation targeting framework (Contreras 
et al., 2017) – but at 43%, the share of firms that have a negative currency mismatch is high and 
structural rigidities remain in the de-dollarization process for firms. 
• Sri Lanka. Annual private sector credit growth decelerated in June 2020; By contrast, credit to the 
public sector has accelerated causing a notable expansion of broad money thus far in 2020. 
Government lending has been spurred by lower rates and government guarantees, notably for the 
construction sector. With the gradual reduction in market lending rates, interest rates applicable on 
new lending by commercial banks, on average, have now reduced to single digit levels. However, 
some market lending rates – for marginal borrowers – remain high. Some improvement in workers’ 
remittances has been observed since June, in contrast to the declining trend observed in March 
2020. As of July, there have been net capital outflows of over US$500 million (0.6 percent of 
GDP).The Sri Lankan currency has also depreciated by around 2.7 percent against the US dollar 
since that time and has since been exacerbated by Fitch Ratings downgrade to Sri Lanka’s long-
term foreign-currency issuer default rating. Sri Lanka’s EMBIG spread has more than doubled since 
mid-February. 
Key directions for monetary responses to ‘build back better’ 
A Protracted U-shaped global growth recovery could occur with isolated regional spread of COVID19. The 
associated ‘uncertainty shock’ (Bloom, 2009) would continue to weigh on potential growth due to the 
economic interruption. Regional outbreaks also suggest supply chain disruptions that would mean 
continued loss of foreign exchange revenue from exports and remittances. This would be particularly 










investment inflows – necessitating further rate cuts and targeted credit easing. It is likely that countries 
with an already high debt overhang, would see their NPL positions worsen. To the extent that countries 
are able to withstand the inflationary effects of currency depreciation, more rate cuts would be warranted 
and further targeted credit to enterprises in hardest hit sectors. In this context, this section examines two 
policy scenarios:  
• Business as usual. The first policy scenario is one in which central banks implement monetary 
policy in order to return their respective economies back to a pre-COVID19 growth path, largely 
using conventional and previously used monetary policy tools. Under our baseline assumption of 
a U-shaped global macroeconomic recovery, these policies would entail a combination of further 
rate cuts, enhanced quantitative easing, and, in more extreme cases where there is limited policy 
space, accessing IMF and bilateral donor funding.  
• Building back better entails a policy package that both returns economies back to their pre-
COVID19 growth path but does so within a context of greater gender equity and resilience to 
climate change. The COVID19 pandemic has put women in particular in a vulnerable position due 
to their roles in the care economy (Diallo et al., 2020). Government and central banks could allocate 
more spending on public investment in the care economy, and in green finance, with central banks 
providing low-cost credit to stimulate private investment.  
We examine each of these policy scenarios in each of the country contexts: 
• Bangladesh. A policy package that would build back better would improve financial access and 
financial literacy for women, particularly in rural areas. To date, there is no national financial literacy 
plan in Bangladesh and 60% of its adult population is left out of formal access to finance – 
suggesting that banks and MFIs have yet to penetrate at the individual level (Khalily, 2016). 
Additional targeted credit for women-led small businesses would enhance the transmission of 
policy, particularly as the demand for microcredit among poorer households is interest rate 
sensitive (Dehejia et al., 2005). If female workplace participation becomes commensurate to men’s, 
this would help bring about a 27% increase in gross domestic product (ADB, 2016). When it comes 
to climate risks, targeted credit to sustainable investments is crucial (Hossain, 2018). Given 
Bangladesh’s extreme weather events, utilising a climate-risk-adjusted GDP figure in setting 
monetary policy would imply a lower (and more catalytic) natural rate of interest. 
 
• Tanzania. Further cuts to its benchmark interest rate, below 5%, would help stimulate the 
consumption-sensitive sectors typically serviced by women. Financial literacy in Tanzania remains 
low and therefore needs to be a funding priority that is further resourced by the central bank. The 
recently merged Tanzania Women’s Bank should receive extra funding from the BOT, alongside 
adjusted macroprudential requirements, in order to make finance more easily accessible and 
affordable for women entrepreneurs. The effects of climate change in Tanzania are widespread 
and particularly harmful to its agriculture sector (Shemsanga et al., 2010) and have largely been 
ignored in the context of an overriding policy goal of industrialisation (LSE, 2015). Crucially, 
Tanzania’s discovery of natural gas, and its natural gas revenue fund, could be used to build 
expertise and green investments for sustainable finance to counter climate shocks.  
 
 
• Kenya. In order to improve the credit transmission mechanism, there needs to be new forms of 
lending to women-owned SMEs; evidence suggests that both group-based and individual-based 
lending policies are not responsive to the financing needs of women vis-à-vis the changes in 
Kenya’s business environment (Ouma and Rambo, 2013).  Relaxing collateral requirements for 
women entrepreneurs or promoting particular types of investments that allow women to scale their 
businesses would create more possibility of gender equity.10 In terms of climate change and Green 
finance, its central bank – and Kenya’s new sovereign wealth fund – can promote a greater pool of 
 
 
10In addition, central banks can use their regulatory power to channel credit to uses that support the realization of rights and promote gender 
equality. Policies and regulations can also encourage credit to be extended to improve housing, stimulate job-creating investments or pro- 






expertise in structuring green investments. The central bank should provide an incentive system 
whereby Kenyan Green bonds offer a higher return compared to conventional paper. This is 
because high returns on government bonds tend to “crowd out” investments in other asset classes, 
such as green finance, while lending to established sectors is supported by a better risk-return 
profile (Bjerborn and Kirima, 2015). 
 
• Peru. The central bank should facilitate extra liquidity targeted to women-led rural MFIs in Peru, 
which have had consistently disproportionately less funding than urban-based MFIs. Peru has 
increased its transaction allowance limits on digital services, however, more liquidity, regulatory 
oversight and support and training for microentrepreneurs in the countryside need funding (IFC, 
2013; CGAP, 2020). Authorities also needs to continue to de-dollarise to prevent negative currency 
mismatches for the spectrum of businesses. The central bank is in a position to facilitate this.  In 
terms of climate change, Peru has emerged as one of Latin America’s more active countries by 
making voluntary emission reduction pledges in its forestry, energy, and waste sectors. And yet, 
there is an element of risk aversion in investing in renewable energy (BMZ, 2014). The central bank 
could employ macroprudential regulations to facilitate investments in this arena/ The CRBP could 
develop the groundwork for Green quantitative easing (QE) in the light of the country’s historically 
low interest rates and its relatively developed financial markets.  
 
• Sri Lanka. Microcredit and financial literacy is instrumental in improving the lives of women, and 
yet there is an under-provision of it in Sri Lanka (Yogendrarajah, 2016). The economy has seen its 
interest rate spread remain high. Against this backdrop, the cost credit for businesses, particularly 
that of MFIs, should be lowered for women entrepreneurs. Access to, and funding for mobile 
finance in the rural economy should be improved to become more widespread. The central bank 
could devote resources to this, or even make female employment an explicit target in its policy 
reaction function. When it comes to climate risks, Sri Lanka is highly vulnerable to the risks 
associated with climate change; central bank involvement in mitigating these risks linked to 
hotspots – that are subject to extreme weather conditions such as droughts and flooding – can 
involve a number of tools. Within the context of Sri Lanka’s Vision 2030, its initiatives for green 
loans, green leases and green bonds (CBSL, 2019) – green  QE should be considered in order to 




































APPENDIX 2: EXAMPLES OF TRADE POLICY RESPONSES 
 
Fast recovery – trade policy options 
Increase in import restrictions: A faster recovery in the short run could be achieved by boosting the 
domestic competitiveness of local businesses by increasing tariffs, non-automatic import licenses, 
enacting restricting regulations and other measures. This is likely to increase activity and employment in 
inefficient sectors and industries but no in productivity. Consequently, in the long run, economic growth is 
expected to be low in virtue of the inefficient allocation of resources.   
Devaluation of exchange rates: In order to boost domestic activity, Central Banks may be inclined to 
devaluate their currencies with the aim of increasing export and import prices in domestic currency. This 
complements the increase in import restriction measures and can generate, in the long run, an expansion 
effect. However, in the context of developing countries, these measures tend to be contracting in the long 
run.   
Prioritisation of domestic suppliers in government procurement: to boost economic activity, the 
Government may favour domestic suppliers or restrict the participation of foreign suppliers in tendering 
processes. This is likely to generate inefficient expenditure and, although it may boost activity in the short 
run, will jeopardise economic growth by putting additional fiscal pressure in the long run.  
Tax incentives in labour-intensive and traditional sectors: Tax incentives to sectors intensive in the 
use of labour (traditional services) can deliver higher employment but with little prospect of productivity 
growth. This could slow down economic transformation. The tax incentives will not consider any kind 
of environmental or gender impact.  
Trade agreements aimed to increase mutual trade diversion. Trade diverting agreements can be 
considered with the aim of boosting activity. However, rather than focusing in increasing efficiency, these 
agreements will be set with the aim of mutually divert trade away from efficient suppliers into domestic 
inefficient suppliers.  
Incentives to the development of local/regional supply chains with little efficiency 
consideration: To reduce the reliance on global value chains, Governments may aim to develop and/or 
cooperate in the development of local or regional supply chains. If these actions are not aimed to 
address coordination issues that affect the exploitation of comparative advantages, this will lead to 
inefficiency.  
More government intervention in the domestic economy aimed to boost economic activity 
(e.g. price setting): To speed up the recovery, intervention on key sectors such as energy production or 
transport, can be considered. For example, fixing or administering prices of critical inputs could contribute 
to the economic recovery in other sectors but it may damage the competitiveness of the intervened sector 
which could lead to lower future output.  
Building back better – rainbow recovery trade policy options 
This scenario involves the assumption of an attempt of using the crisis to generate substantial reforms to 
achieve economic transformation and a climate friendly economic growth path. This scenario involves a 
reallocation of economic resources from low into high productivity and from dirty to cleaner activities. In 
the long run, the productivity and the economy growth is higher with a smaller effect on the environment 
and climate. However, in the short run, the economic growth is lower as resources are mobilised to other 
sectors.   
Reduction of import measures: This will contribute to increase efficiency and boost welfare in the long 






fall in barriers may not be generalised but enough to eliminate peaks and escalation in protection that 
grant protection to some sectors with respect to others.   
Targeted support to environmental/climate-friendly sector, products, processes and 
technologies: Tax incentives and subsidies to key environmental/climate friendly sectors could 
contribute to generate a reallocation of resources towards the production in these sectors. This targeted 
measures articulate very well with a neutral trade policy. The neutral trade policy helps to protect 
consumers by bringing competition to the markets and the targeted support to these products contributes 
to offset some market failures affecting the production.   
Measures to facilitate trade and investment: As the reduction of protection measures, this 
contributes to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of firms by reducing costs to procure 
imported inputs as well as reduce commercialisation costs of exports.   
Trade agreements aimed to increase market access and domestic efficiency: In contrast to trade-
diverting agreements, these type of agreements aim to increase competition in the domestic market, 
increase productivity and also increase market access for exports.   
Government coordination: The action of the Government seeks to facilitate the coordination of 
actors and the provision of critical public goods in targeted sectors. This can be delivered through a series 
of actions including setting special economic zones and export promotion zones where similar firms can 
cluster. The Government engages with the private sector and seeks to address barriers and constraints 
faced by firms when operating.   
Measures to increase women participation and increase labour supply: More women participation in 
the labour market contributes to higher economic activity. Therefore, actions aimed to reduce 
discrimination against women as well as creating instruments to facilitate the insertion of women in the 
market can be considered. The provision of childcare, for example, can contribute to increase the number 







APPENDIX 3: HIGH-FREQUENCY INDICATORS 









Available immediately (e.g. Financial Times 
for oil/copper prices; IMF/World Bank 
weekly/monthly averages with a short time 
lag (a few weeks) 
Variable reflecting 
many issues such 
as supply/demand 
and others 




World Bank Price 





FAO food prices, monthly (a week time lag) 
 
IFPRI’s Food Price Monitor covers daily 
price data for domestic markets in India, 
Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi 
 
National statistics offices 
Localised data 
patchy 




Hunger  WFP, number of people with insufficient 
food consumption, countries with very high 
levels of hunger, updated daily and weekly 
Limited countries 
now (9 African 
now) but 16 more 
planned in coming 
weeks; it is a 
forecast. Weekly 
snapshots for 14 
countries 
WFP Food Hunger 
Map 
 





Daily across countries  Available widely, 
commonly used 
sources but 
difficult to compare 





social and food 
security impacts 
Monthly updates from May 2020. Cover 
topics including (i) knowledge of existence 
of and channels of transmission of COVID-
19; (ii) knowledge of and compliance with 
preventive measures with specific emphasis 
on social distancing and self-isolation; (iii) 
prices and access to food and non-food 
necessities; (iv) employment; (v) food 
insecurity; and (6) subjective well-being – 
with a focus on understanding the dynamics 
of economic impacts 
Once available will 
be very valuable, 
for Ethiopia, 
Malawi, Nigeria, 







Global and bilateral trade, trade costs and mobility 
 
Trade costs   Baltic Exchange Dry Index Trading 
Economics, daily  
Specific cost 





World trade CPB world trade indicator, monthly, 
available with a one- to two-month time lag 
 
IMF tracking of world trade using real-time 
shipping data  




Uses data for dry 
bulk, contain, 
CPB indicator 











Bilateral trade National statistics office and ITC trade map 
(monthly data for major countries such as 
UK, EU, US, China and Japan available 
with a six-week time lag; annual data for 
low-income country source) 
 
International data reported monthly with 
time lag (UN Comtrade) 
Trade data 
variable but long-
runs are available 









Aircraft departures, bus and rail journeys; 
Google searches for entertainment, seated 
diners, retail footfall (updated daily) 
 
Google Mobility data for retail, grocery, 








Google data for all 
countries on a 
weekly basis  
Bank of England 
Monetary Policy 







Capital markets, finance flows and monetary statistics 
 
Remittances Central banks, monthly data, available with 
one to three months time lag 







rates, bond yields 
Available daily and immediately, e.g. 
Financial Times or central bank   
 
Bond prices and bond spreads (yield 
difference countries and safe havens such 
as US/German bonds) 










flows to emerging 
markets 
IIF monthly updates on portfolio flow but not 
FDI flows, available with one to two years of 






BIF international bank lending, quarterly, 





Central banks maintain monthly and 
quarterly data on the monetary base and 
broad money, credit aggregates (e.g. to the 
private sector) and foreign assets and 
liabilities. Includes claims by banks on 
government 
Quality data on a 





Monthly/quarterly, central bank websites, 
lags can be six months  
 Kenya (Table 13)  
 
Nigeria debt service 
in 2019  
 
Ethiopia 
Aid flows OECD DAC 
 
Humanitarian finance: COVID-19 Global 
Humanitarian Response Plan 
DAC (and 
national) data are 
available with long 
time gaps (a year) 
but humanitarian 



















Employment and production  
 
Employment  ILOSTAT provides monthly and quarterly labour 
force statistics (with a time lag of at least two 
months) 
 
ILO Monitor presents results from a nowcast 
model that estimates hours of employment lost 
and job losses compared with 2019 
Up-to-date data 
are patchy with 





per country results 










Covid19 and the 
world of work 
Production National accounts, quarterly, available with six-
week time lag in developed countries, or a lag of 
three to five months in some poorer countries 
 
UNIDO has recent data on industrial production, 
e.g. for the US, China, Russia, Korea, Vietnam, 
Argentina, Chile, Poland  
Data available with 












Data Portals World Bank, updated in an ongoing manner 
 
Several others exist 
 
ODI’s tracker of trackers (tba) 
 Datasets from the 
World Bank 
 
World Bank: COVID 













APPENDIX 4: COVID-19 TRACKERS 
 
During the first half of 2020 a range of Covid-19 trackers and briefings appeared to understand 
socioeconomic conditions and policy responses. For example, there were a range of ODI country briefings  
• Africa: Angola; Cape Verde; Djibouti;  Ethiopia, Egypt; Ghana ; Guinea Bissau ; Kenya ; Liberia; 
Madagascar; Namibia; Nigeria; Philippines; Rwanda; Philippines; Senegal; Sierra Leone; Somalia; 
Somaliland; South Africa, South Sudan; Sri Lanka; Sudan; Tanzania; Uganda 
• Asia: Afghanistan; India ; Indonesia; Nepal; Sri Lanka ; Myanmar 
• Europe: Albania 
• Pacific: Fiji, PNG and Vanuatu 
• Latin America: Brazil; Colombia  
Many international organisations such as the IMF, WB, ILO etc started tracking a range of impacts and 
policies: 
• Economic (trade and production; financial markets) and social impacts  
• Fiscal impacts 
• Monetary, financial and fiscal policy 


























Tracker Description Coverage, 
frequency 





Containment and closure policies 
(e.g., school closures and 
restrictions in movement), 
economic policies (e.g., income 
support or provision of foreign aid) 





sources: news articles, 
gov press releases, 
briefings  





wide coverage.  
UN IOM Mobility 
Impact 
Travel restrictions at the country 
and location level (airport, land 
border points, sea border points, 
internal transit points) 
Global; daily to 
up to every 3 
days 
IATA, media reports, 






IMF tracker of 
policy response 
to covid-19 
Policy measures on fiscal, 
monetary, macro-financial, 










but no methods 
ODI economic 
stimulus tracker 
Country fiscal and monetary 
stimulus, classified per BOP 
support, assistance to firms; 





News reports, official 









Fiscal stimulus package, with 
checklist on support for 
wage/employment, cash transfers, 







checked with ‘other 
sources’ 








Policy measures, sources of 
financing of measures, external 





IMF tracker, OECD 
tracker, New York FED 
+ National/local sources 
(central banks, DoFs)  
















Publicly available media 
and government 
sources 









Interventions by central banks, 
fiscal authorities and organisations 





Publicly available media 
and government 
sources 















Not stated, appears to 
be media and 
government sources  











Measures covering corporate tax, 
tax payments/amnesties, indirect 





Not stated, some source 












Social policy and impact  
 
Tracker (Entity) Description Coverage; 
freq. 





Social protection (social assistance, cash 
and in-kind transfers, social insurance), 
labour market interventions 




3: Validated by 






Social security measures to address health, 



















Data on social distancing, movement 
restrictions, public health measures, social 
and economic measures, lockdowns 


















Containment and closure policies (e.g., 
school closures and restrictions in 
movement), economic policies (e.g., 
income support or provision of foreign aid) 




















Indirect socioeconomic impacts on travel, 
lockdown, education, service disruptions 
(WASH etc), healthcare 















Tracker (Entity) Description Coverage; 
freq. 





School closures (localised, country-wide, 











Food security information, weather, 
population size, conflict, hazards, nutrition 























Impact on political violence and protest, 
demonstration activity, state repression, 














Humanitarian exemptions, movement 
restrictions, public health, social/econ, 
social distancing; Vulnerable groups 


















Resources on child poverty, gender, long-
term care Various surveys. rapid 
assessment of informal workers (WIEGO), 







Mapping of research evidence including 
socioeconomic impacts: Food security & 
livelihoods (Caribbean), Citizens’ Attitudes, 
Life with Corona Survey, International 








Tracker Descriptionion Coverage, frequency 
ODI donor response tracker 
Global organisations, multilateral/regional/sub-




KFF Donor Funding for the 
Global Novel Coronavirus 
Response 
Bilateral, private sector donors Global; frequent 
Forbes: Billionaire response 
tracker  
Private sector donors 
Global (mostly US-based); 
periodically  
IMF COVID emergency 
financial assistance IMF commitments 
Low and middle income 
countries, daily 
WB COVID operational 
responses  WB operational responses  
Low and middle income 
countries, daily 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
